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Casenotes
Borelli v. Brusseau: Must a Spouse Also Be a
Registered Nurse? A Feminist Critique
Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. There
remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house.
-John Stuart Mill'
INTRODUCTION
Over time, women have been treated as unequal participants in
society. Laws were enacted which limited a woman's ability to, inter
alia, own property, write out a will, and enter into a contract. Today, for
the most part, women experience formal legal equality with the passage of
federal and state laws which require the equal treatment of men and
women.' In spite of this, women have not achieved true equality.' True
equality stands for the proposition that women have economic and political
1. JOHN S. MILL, THE SUBJECnON OF WOMEN 86 (Susan Moller Okin ed., 1988).
2. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCrRINE, COMMENTARY 1 (1993)
(noting that at common law married women were thought of as their husband's property); infra notes 130-168
and accompanying text (delineating the historical subordination of women).
3. See BARTLET, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that women were not able to enter into a contract, create
a will, own property, or control their separate property estates); infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text
(enunciating the rules applicable to women at common law).
4. See Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
1979 WIs. L. REv. 55, 68 (1979) (finding formal equality to be one way to define the principle of fundamental
equality, since the exact nature of equality is ambiguous). Formal equality is said by some to be the insistence
of equal application of the law. Id. at 68 n.53. Under the definition of equality as only being formal equality,
sex discrimination law seeks to have no formal legal right be abridged on the basis of sex. Id. at 89. Professor
Powers, however, argues that formal equality is not expansive enough. Id. Rather, Professor Powers advocates
equal social participation of women and men as the proper goal. lI& at 102. Yet, since women workers have dual
careers, with responsibilities at home and at work, their equal participation in the public sphere of jobs and
careers is inhibited. Id. at 105-06; see infra note 174 (setting forth the numerous federal and California statutes
which purport to guarantee equal access for men and women to public accommodations, housing, education,
athletics, insurance, credit, government benefits, and pension plans).
5. See Powers, supra note 4, at 79-80 (maintaining that numerous legal barriers to women's full
participation in public life still exist, such as the lawful exclusion of women from certain occupations solely on
account of gender, the United States Supreme Court's recognition that separate but equal is alright based on sex
in government education, and the adverse treatment that women workers face in employment benefit plans due
to their childbearing responsibilities).
1387
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 25
equality with men, in addition to formal legal equality.6 True equality has
not been effectuated, due in part to a dichotomy that separates society into
two spheres-a public sphere and a private sphere.7 Some feminist
scholars argue that women are excluded from the public sphere, which
includes politics, law, and business, while they are relegated to the private
sphere, comprised of the family, home, and childrearing.8 Scholars argue
that the effect of the public/private dichotomy is that women have tradi-
tionally been and continue to be subordinated by the law.9 Subordination
still exists today because the law generally refrains from entering the pri-
vate realm and regulating activities within the marriage.10 Thus, following
the tradition of legal subordination of women, the Court of Appeal for the
First District of California in Borelli v. Brusseau" held that a husband
and wife's oral contract was unenforceable for want of consideration. 12
6. SusAN D. Ross ET. AL., THE RImS OF WOMEN - THE BASIC ACLU GUtnE TO WOMEN's Ro's
xiv-xv (Norman Dorsen ed., 3d ed. 1993); See Powers, supra note 4, at 102 (calling for equal participation for
women and men in society).
7. See infra notes 137-149 and accompanying text (discussing the public/private dichotomy that operates
to minimalize the existence of women).
8. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 .3 (1992)
(stating that feminist theories have been classified by their critique of the dichotomy); infra notes 147-167 and
accompanying text (discussing the effects upon women of having a public/private dichotomy). See generally
Symposium on The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982) (showcasing a collection of
treatments of the public/private distinction).
9. See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE
POLICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 154-55 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (establishing that the law
is absent from the private sphere because of its failure to recognize and regulate familial conflicts, such as wife
beating, and the failure to enforce promissory arrangements between spouses for provision of domestic services).
10. See LENORE J. WmZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 71 (1981) [hereinafter MARRIAGE CONTRACT]
(highlighting the fact that courts have voided agreements by husbands to compensate wives for their work when
the services are characterized by courts as a "wifely task"). Women's marital tasks have included housekeeping,
entertaining, child care, participating in the husband's business or working on their husbands' farms. Id.; see
Frame v. Frame, 36 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. 1931) (striking down an agreement between husband and wife to
compensate the wife for her work on his farm, since the wife had a pre-existing duty to provide these services
without compensation). The wife kept the farm accounts, cooked for the hired help, collected rent, supervised
field work, and sold the produce from the farm. Id at 153.
11. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993).
12. ld at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20; see MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 71 (contending that
a wife is effectively precluded from receiving any monetary compensation for a large share of her life's work,
since she is assigned the chores of domestic services by the traditional marriage contract), Since the law treats
a wife's labor as her statutory duty, it deprives her of means for financial gain, and makes her dependent upon
and subservient to her husband. Id. at 73; see infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (setting out the
requirements for a valid contract, in particular, mutual assent, offer, acceptance, and consideration); infra notes
169-185 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that even though women have largely achieved formal
equality, with federal provisions like Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and their California equivalents,
women are still subordinated by subtle and entrenched ways of society); infra notes 248-251 and accompanying
text (noting the holding of Borelli and its discussion of consideration).
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The Borelli court applied the traditional requirements for a valid con-
tract and held that there was no consideration. 13 California Family Code
section 850, however, has arguably removed the consideration requirement
for agreements between spouses regarding the disposition of property. 4
The Borelli court either ignored this provision, failed to recall its existence,
or believed that it was inapposite to the agreement at issue. 5 Because
stable marriages are essential to an ordered society and contracts for nur-
sing care services upset marital stability, the court also held that the
Borelli's nursing care service contract was void since enforcement would
be contrary to public policy.' 6 The court found that public policy requires
regulation of the marriage relationship.
1 7
Regardless of the Borelli court's holding that a wife cannot contract for
her husband's separate property, the law is clear that under California's
community property scheme married people can contract with each other
with regard to the nature of their property."8 Spouses can agree to change
the separate or community nature of their property at any time.' 9 A mari-
tal contract, including one whose terms call for changing the nature of
property in exchange for nursing care services, should be treated as any
13. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
14. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (providing that consideration is not required for agreements
among spouses regarding property transmutations); id. § 1500 (West 1994) (establishing that the community
property laws which define the respective property rights among husband and wife can be altered with a
prenuptial agreement or other marital property agreement). Effective January 1, 1994, certain sections in the Civil
Code, Code of Civil Procedure, Evidence Code, and Probate Code appear in the California Family Code. 1992
Cal. Stat. ch. 162, sec. 1-14, at 1-265. For a disposition of the repealed sections in connection with the California
Family Code, see CAL FAM. CODE at xxix-xli (West 1994). See also 1 E. ALLAN FmaswoRm, FARNsWORTH
ON CONTRACrS § 2.3, at 64 (1990) (stating that consideration usually takes form as a return promise); infra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of California Family Code § 850); infra notes
60-63 and accompanying text (noting the requirements for a valid premarital agreement).
15. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (discussing consideration instead of
applying California Family Code § 850).
16. Id.
17. I1& at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19; see Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 86, 142 P.2d 417, 419 (1943)
(noting that for the benefit of society, laws shall not encourage dissolution of established marital relationships);
infra notes 243-249 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy holding of Borelil).
18. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1620 (West 1994) (stating that spouses cannot alter the essential elements
of marriage, such as support, or their legal obligations to each other, but can alter the character of their property
by agreement); iU § 721 (West 1994) (allowing a husband and wife to contract with each other as if they were
unmarried). Spouses are subject to a fiduciary duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing when managing
community property. d. California Family Code § 1101 gives a remedy where there is an impairment of the
claimant spouse's interest in the community estate, as a result of a breach of the fiduciary duty. Id. § 1101 (West
1994).
19. See CAL. FAM. CoDE § 850 (West 1994) (allowing the character of property owned by married people
to be changed).
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other agreement between private parties.20 Indeed, a marriage certificate
should not be used to limit the contracting ability of married people.
21
Courts should adhere to the traditional contract doctrine of facilitating the
objectively manifested intent of the parties in the marital contract con-
text.22 Although contracts have been portrayed as private events to be free
from government interference since the mid-nineteenth century, courts have
failed to apply traditional contract doctrine by refusing to enforce spousal
agreements in favor of wives.23 The reasoning typically given is that in
order to protect the domestic harmony of the couple, the law should not
interfere with an ongoing marital relationship.24 However, marital con-
tracts should not be an exception to general contract principles.
In Borelli v. Brusseau,25 the Court of Appeal for the First District of
California held that a wife cannot contract with her husband to provide
him with nursing care services in exchange for his separate property
assets. 26 The wife unsuccessfully contended that their oral agreement
should be enforced, since she had performed her part of the bargain.27
The court, however, refused to find the agreement enforceable, by restating
the traditional rule that a husband is entitled to the personal performance
of nursing care services as part of the spousal duty of support.28 There-
20. See id § 721 (West 1994) (permitting husband and wife to enter into contracts with each other
regarding property, as if they were not married); see also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 5.1 (noting that the
principle of freedom of contract relies upon the premise that it is in the public interest to give broad power to
people so they can order their affairs through legally enforceable agreements). In general, therefore, parties are
free to make agreements, and courts will enforce them without passing judgment on their substance. Id.; see infra
notes 370-374 and accompanying text (declaring it absurd for courts to allow non-married parties to contract
for nursing care while refusing to enforce such contracts between married people).
21. See MARRIAGE CONTRACr, supra note 10, at 341 (predicating that discrimination arises when a court
refuses to allow husband and wife to contract regarding support duties).
22. See id. at 352 (arguing that it is improper for courts to subject contracts between spouses to stricter
standards than unmarried contracting parties, since a husband and wife should have expectations just like
unmarried parties that their contracts will be enforced by courts); see also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997, 1000 (1985) (stating that contract law, as reflected in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, has a preference for objective intent over subjective intent).
23. See Dalton, supra note 22, at 1010 (noting that the discourse of contract doctrine has attempted to
portray contract law as essentially private and free).
24. Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (2d Dist. 1941); Coleman v. Burr,
93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883); see Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 22-23 (1st Dist.
1993) (PochE, J., dissenting) (finding it absurd for courts to refuse to adjudicate domestic relationships where
one spouse has died, as occurred in Borelli, since there is no longer a marital relationship to preserve); infra
notes 87-129 and accompanying text (highlighting the traditional position of the courts in California regarding
spousal contracts for services).
25. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993).
26. Id., at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
27. Id at 649, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17; see infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text (summarizing the
facts of Borell:).
28. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
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fore, because the wife had a pre-existing duty to care for her husband, the
court found the contract lacking consideration for the mutual exchange of
promises and was, thus, unenforceable. 29 Significantly, the court's holding
fails to mention Family Code section 850, which explicitly states that
consideration is not required for an agreement to transmute property. 0
This Note argues that by not enforcing a husband's promise to transfer
property in exchange for nursing care services, the Court of Appeal for the
First District of California, in Borelli v. Brusseau,31 denied a woman the
enforcement of a valid and performed contract, thereby evidencing the
continuing subordination of women before the law.32 Part I of this Note
reviews the statutory duties that spouses owe each other and outlines the
historical and current legal subordination of women, which persists even
in the face of formal legal equality.33 Part II discusses the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Borelli Court.34 Part III examines the ramifi-
cations of the Borelli decision, specifically: the continuing subtle subordi-
nation of women; concerns regarding the consideration requirement; and
feasible alternatives for enforcing spousal agreements.3 ' The requirement
of consideration is especially intriguing since the court overlooked Family
Code section 850, which arguably should have controlled the agreement
between husband and wife.
29. l; see Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 119 P.2d 970, 972-73 (2d Dist. 1941) (holding
that the marriage contract calls for a wife to provide her husband with nursing care services); Estate of
Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 475,479, 73 P.2d 643,645 (lst Dist. 1937) (finding the performance
of nursing care services without compensation by a spouse to be an implied term of the marriage contract); see
also infra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (outlining the traditional duties of a wife, as seen in Brooks and
Sonnicksen); infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-existing duty rule); infra notes 243-
251 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Borelhf).
30. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (stating that spouses may contract to alter the character of
property from separate property of one spouse to the separate property of the other, with or without
consideration).
31. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993).
32. See infra notes 336-374 and accompanying text (discussing the legal ramifications of the Borelli
decision on women's equality).
33. See infra notes 36-187 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 188-323 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 324-414 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1849, a system of community property36 was enacted in California,
during the state's first constitutional convention.37 The resulting consti-
tutional provision encompassed the basic principle of Spanish community
property law, which was in force during the period of Spanish and Mexi-
can control of the California territory.38 Spanish law characterized owner-
ship of marital property as either separate or community.39 The California
Constitution mandates that all property owned by the wife before marriage
and all property acquired by her after marriage by gift, devise or descent
will be her separate property.40 In addition, the California Constitution
contains a provision directing the legislature to pass laws regarding com-
munity property, which the California Legislature did, starting in 1850.41
The first enactments defined separate and community property, set up the
equal division of community property among the spouses in event of death
or divorce, as well as established that the husband had the sole power to
manage and control his wife's separate property and all of their community
estate.42
36. See CAL FAM. CODE § 760 (West 1994) (defining community property as all real and personal
property, wherever situated, that is acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in
California, unless otherwise provided by statute).
37. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (1849), amended by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21; see GRACE GANZ
BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY iN CALiFoRNIA 92 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that the 1849 California
constitutional convention raised the Spanish civil law of community property to constitutional status).
38. See CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 14 (1849), amended by CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (establishing that a wife
owns all property acquired before marriage and all property acquired afterwards by gift, devise or descent as her
separate property); BLUMBERO, supra note 37, at 92 (noting that one element of California's civil law during
Spanish and Mexican rule was Spanish community property law).
39. See BLUMBERG, supra note 37, at 94 (noting that while California adopted the Spanish principle of
property ownership as separate or community, California deviated from Spanish civil law respecting management
of the community estate, and gave the power of management and control only to the husband).
40. CAL. CONST. art. Xl, § 14 (1849), amended by CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
41. See id. (establishing the state legislature's power to enact laws relating to property held by the wife
in commcn with her husband); see also BLUJMBERO, supra note 37, at 94 (noting that the 1850 legislation
followed Spanish law exactly with respect to its characterization of ownership of property as either separate
property or community property).
42. See Act of Apr. 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 1, 1849-50 Cal. Stat. at 254 (defining separate property as
property owned before marriage or acquired during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent); id. § 2 (stating
that common property was property acquired by either spouse during the marriage other than by gift or
inheritance); id § 6 (giving the wife no control over her own separate property, but rather vesting this power
in her husband); id § 9 (establishing the management and control of the community property estate solely in
the husband); id § 11 at 255 (maintaining that with the death of a spouse, one half of the community property
shall go to the surviving spouse, and the other half to the descendants of the decedent); id. § 12 (declaring that
upon divorce, each spouse will receive one half of the community estate).
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Even though the purpose of adopting community property law was to
increase the legal rights of women,43 this objective still has not been met
to the satisfaction of many. 44 Today there still exists a great inequality
between men and women regarding treatment by the law in particular, and
by society in general.45 To understand a feminist critique of the court's
decision in Borelli v. Brusseau,46 an understanding of general principles
of community property and contract law, of the traditional rule regarding
spousal duties, and the history of women's subordination by the law is
necessary.
A. The Law of Community Property in California
California is one of only nine states that has adopted community
property as a system for dividing marital property.47 Community property
43. See BLUMBERG, supra note 37, at 92 (stating that the constitutional convention was moved to adopt
community property law in an attempt to enhance married women's legal status). Another motivation for
installing a system of community property in California was to reconcile with California's Spanish-speaking
minority. Id.
44. See infra notes 130-187 and accompanying text (detailing the feminist criticisms of women's
traditional and current subordination before the law, due in part to their relegation to the private sphere, which
encompasses the family, the home, and childrearing).
45. See SUsAN MOLLER OKIN, JusTIC, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 3 (1989) (noting that there is
substantial inequality among men and women). The examples Okin discusses include the differential between
men and women's wage earnings, elderly poverty rates, distribution of housework, and representation in
government. Id. For example, women earn 71% of what men do. Id. at 3. Additionally, women are responsible
for more housework and child care, even when women work outside the house as much as their husbands. Id.
at 4.
46. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ist Dist. 1993).
47. See BLUMBERG, supra note 37, at 6-7 (stating that community property is associated with eight
contiguous states, plus Wisconsin). In California, New Mexico, and Louisiana the general rule is that property
is divided fifty-fifty upon divorce and at death. Id. at 6; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 1994) (stating that
upon dissolution a court shall divide the community property equally); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West
1985); Bustos v. Bustos, 673 P.2d 1289, 1291 (N.M. 1983). Five other states, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Texas,
and Washington, allow courts to make an equitable, not a 50-50 division per se, distribution of community
property upon divorce. BLUMBERG, supra note 37, at 6; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1991); IDAHO
CODE § 32-712 (Michie 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (Michie 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63
(Vernon 1992 Supp.); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West Supp. 1993). The ninth state, Wisconsin,
adopted the Uniform Marriage Property Act, which is essentially the same as community property. WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 766.001-.97 (West 1993); see BLUMBERG, supra note 37, at 7 (explaining that the Uniform Marriage
Property Act drafters designed a full-blown system of community property). Community property is also the
marital property system of Puerto Rico. 11 Cal. Faro. L. Serv. (Bancroft-Whitney) § 11:4 (1991). The remaining
forty-one states are common law jurisdictions. BLUMBERG, supra note 37, at 3 (stating that in common law states
property is not held jointly by husband and wife unless both specifically elect to take joint title). Property thus
belongs either to the husband or the wife. Id.; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315 (Michie Supp. 1991)
(proclaiming that all marital property shall be distributed with one-half to each party, unless the court finds that
such a division will work an inequity); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1990) (stating that division will
be done without regard to marital misconduct).
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includes all property earned or acquired during marriage by the labor of
either spouse. 8 California law provides that each spouse has a present
one-half interest in all community property.49 Separate property, on the
other hand, is property acquired before marriage or property acquired
during the marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and all the
earnings that arise from this separate property. Separate property is not
subject to division at death or divorce, but remains the property of the
spouse holding title.5' To determine whether property is community
property or separate property, there is a general presumption which
provides that all property acquired during marriage is community
property. 2
48. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 1994) (defining community property as all real property located
in California, all personal property wherever located, and all property held in trust that was acquired during the
marriage by a spouse domiciled in California, and that is not separate property of either spouse as defined in
California Family Code §§ 770,771 and 781). Community property in trust is subject to California Family Code
§ 761, which provides that community property transferred into a trust remains community property, if the trust
is revocable and the power to modify the trust can only be exercised with the consent of both spouses. CAL.
FAM. CODE § 761 (West 1994). Certain personal injury awards to a married person are also community property.
Id. § 780 (West 1994) (providing that if the cause of action for personal injury arose during the marriage, then
the damage award is community property, subject to § 781); id. § 781 (West 1994) (awarding a personal injury
award to the separate estate of a injured spouse if the cause of action arose after dissolution of the marriage, or
if the other spouse is the source of the injury upon which suit has been brought); infra note 52 and
accompanying text (discussing the California Family Code §§ 770 and 771, which set forth the assets to be
characterized as separate property).
49. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 1994) (providing for the equal division of the community estate
between the spouses). The community estate is defined as both community property and quasi community
property. Id. § 63 (West 1994). Quasi community property is all real and personal property, wherever located,
that is acquired by either spouse while domiciled outside California, which would be community property if the
spouse had been domiciled in California at the time of acquisition. Id. § 125 (West 1994).
50. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21; CAL. FAN. CODE § 770 (West 1994); see id. § 771 (West 1994) (declaring
that separate property includes the property accumulated by the spouse, and the minor children in the custody
of the spouse while living separate and apart from the other); THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF WILts 4 (2d ed. 1953) (defining bequest as personal property that passes by will). Devise is the term used
to describe disposing of real property by will. Id. Descent is the passing of real property to the decedent's heirs
by intestate succession. Id. These terms, Professor Atkinson notes, however, are often used interchangeably,
without making a difference as to their legal effect. Id.
51. See CAL. FAl. CODE § 752 (West 1994) (declaring that a husband or wife does not have any interest
in the separate property of the other).
52. See id. § 760 (West 1994) (creating the basic presumption that all property acquired during marriage
by either spouse is community property unless it comes within a specified exception). The major exceptions are
those relating to separate property. See id. § 130 (West 1994) (defining, for statutory consistency, that separate
property includes all separate property discussed in the California Family Code sections beginning with § 760);
id. § 770 (West 1994) (creating an exception to the general community property presumption by defining
separate property of a married person as all property owned before the marriage, plus all property that the spouse
acquires during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and all the rents and profits that issue from this
separate property); id. § 771 (West 1994) (stating that one's separate property includes property accumulated
while living separate and apart from their spouse is an exception to the presumption that all property acquired
during marriage is community property); id. § 772 (West 1994) (noting that after entry of judgment for legal
separation of the spouses, each party's earnings are his or her own separate property and are not subject to the
1394
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The criteria for how courts label property as either separate or
community property is established by statute.53 Spouses, however, are not
required to follow the label mandated by statute.54 A husband and wife
can agree by contract, before or during .the marriage, to change the
characterization of some or all of their marital property estate.55 Because
these agreements regarding property are contracts, a discussion of how
contract law applies to the law of California community property will
follow. 5 6
1. Spouses Can Contract Out of California Community Property
Law
The state's community property laws automatically apply to married
California domiciliaries. 57  A husband and wife, however, can contract
around the community property laws, if they choose, by either a premarital
agreement or transmutation.58 A transmutation is an agreement between
presumption that earnings during marriage are community property); id § 781 (West 1994) (stating that personal
injury damages are the separate property of the injured spouse, and not community property, if the cause of
action arose after dissolution or legal separation, if they are living separate and apart, or if the tortfeasor is the
other spouse); see also id § 803 (West 1994) (stating that pre-1975 property transfers which name a married
woman as the sole transferee are presumed to be her separate property, unless the instrument expresses a
different intention); id § 2581 (West 1994) (providing that for the purpose of dividing property at divorce,
property in any form of co-ownership, such as joint tenancy or tenancy in common, is presumed to be
community property); In re Marriage of Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 1185-86, 212 Cal. Rptr. 803, 807 (4th
Dist. 1985) (stating that the general community property presumption can be rebutted by the separate property
proponent).
53. See supra notes 48, 52 and accompanying text (setting forth the applicable California Family Code
provisions that define community and separate property).
54. See CAL FAM. CODE § 1500 (West 1994) (allowing spouses to change their relations regarding
property by a prenuptial agreement or other agreement made during marriage).
55. Id; see infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (delineating the requirements for a valid prenuptial
agreement); infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (reporting the formalities that are to be met for a valid
marital property agreement).
56. See infra notes 75-81, 87-129 and accompanying text (highlighting traditional contract requirements,
the doctrine of pre-existing duty, and the rights and duties that spouses owe to the other, as set forth in
California statutes and case law).
57. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 760 (West 1994) (establishing that while domiciled in California, all property
acquired by a married person is community property, unless the property is defined as separate property
elsewhere in the California Family Code).
58. See id. § 1500 (West 1994) (stating that the community property laws which prescribe the respective
property rights between the spouses can be changed with a prenuptial agreement or other marital property
agreement); see, e.g., Fay v. Fay, 165 Cal. 469, 473, 132 P. 1040, 1042 (1913) (holding that husband and wife
can change the character of their property from community property to separate property by contract); Tompkins
v. Bishop, 94 Cal. App. 2d 546, 550, 211 P.2d 14, 16 (1st Dist. 1949) (stating that statutory law allows spouses
to change the character of their property during the marriage by contract); infra notes 60-63 and accompanying
text (discussing premarital agreements).
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the husband and wife during marriage to alter the characterization of the
community or separate property.59
The first method to contract out of community property laws is by a
premarital agreement.'0 A premarital agreement is defined as an agree-
ment between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage.6'
For a premarital agreement to be valid the agreement must be in writing
and signed by both spouses.62 Consideration is not required for a valid
premarital agreement. 63
The other method available to spouses wishing to contract out of the
community property scheme is a transmutation of property.(4 Family
Code section 850 states that married persons may transmute community
property to separate property of either spouse; transmute the separate
property of either spouse to community property; or transmute the separate
property of one spouse to the separate property of the other spouse.65
Prior to 1985, no formal requirements for a valid transmutation existed. 6
In fact, California law permitted an oral transmutation between husband
59. See CAL FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (allowing spouses to alter their property arrangements by
agreement).
60. See id. § 1500 (West 1994) (establishing that husband and wife can use a marital property agreement
or a prenuptial agreement to alter the community property scheme); see also id. §§ 1600-1617 (West 1994)
(setting forth the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which provides for the proper subject matter of a
premarital agreement, the date of effectiveness, and the process for revocation).
61. See CAL FAM. CODE § 1610(a) (West 1994) (stating that a premarital agreement means an agreement
between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage, and which will be effective upon marriage).
The proper subject matter for a premarital agreement includes the right of management and control of property
and the disposition of property upon death, marital dissolution, or any other event. Id. § 1612 (West 1994). The
parties, however, cannot contract out of the support obligation, since it is the duty of every person to support
his spouse. Id. §§ 1620, 4300 (West 1994). The effective date of a premarital agreement is when the parties
marry. Id. § 1613 (West 1994). The premarital agreement can only be amended or revoked by a written
agreement signed by both parties, with no requirement for consideration. Id § 1614 (West 1994).
62. Id § 1611 (West 1994); cf. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 329, 131
Cal. Rptr. 3, 9 (1976) (holding that the language of a premarital agreement, an agreement between prospective
spouses about the character of their separate property assets, cannot objectively promote dissolution),
63. CAL FAM. CODE § 1611 (West 1994).
64. See id § 1500 (West 1994) (stating that the community property laws which prescribe the respective
property rights between the spouses can be changed with a marital property agreement).
65. Id. § 850 (West 1994). This provision is subject to California Family Code §§ 851-853, Id.; see id.
§ 851 (West 1994) (providing that transmutations are subject to the law governing fraudulent transfers); id. §
852 (West 1994) (stating that a transmutation must be in writing); id. § 853 (West 1994) (noting that a will
provision which states the character of property is not admissible as evidence of a transmutation if the person
who made the will has not died yet).
66. See, e.g., Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 255, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 490 (1st Dist. 1972)
(holding that an effective transmutation does not have to meet any particular requirements); James v. Pawscy,
162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 749, 328 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1st Dist. 1958) (declaring that no particular formalities are
necessary to effectuate an agreement to transmute property among spouses); In re Raphael's Estate, 91 Cal. App.
2d 931, 939, 206 P.2d 391,396 (Ist Dist. 1949) (rejecting the argument that an executed oral agreement should
not be enforced since it did not have the traditional contract requirements).
1396
1994 / Borelli v. Brusseau
and wife notwithstanding the statute of frauds.67 In response to concerns
about how easily property could be transmuted, Family Code sections 850
through 853 were promulgated to place requirements on transmutations. 8
Thus, a transmutation must now be in writing with an express declaration
that the transmutation is adopted by the adversely affected spouse.69
Furthermore, Family Code section 850 expressly allows a transmutation to
67. See Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal. 134, 136, 30 P.2d 398, 399 (1934) (stating that an executed oral
agreement can be established by acts and declarations of the parties to the oral agreement which confirm and
are consistent with a change in the characterization of the property); In re Estate of Wahlefeld, 105 Cal. App.
770, 775-776, 288 P. 870, 872-873 (1930) (finding an oral agreement between the spouses regarding a
transmutation, if fully executed, to be sufficient and not in conflict with the statute of frauds). There are several
statute of frauds provisions in California which judges avoided by the creation of the executed oral agreement
exception. See, e.g., CAL CiV. CODE § 1091 (West 1982) (requiting that every transfer of an estate of real
property be documented by a writing signed by the party disposing of the estate, unless the transfer is for less
than one year); id. § 1624 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that contracts which fall within its provisions are
invalid, unless there is a written memorandum which is signed by the party to be charged). Oral agreements to
devise property by will, such as the agreement in Borelli, fall under the writing requirement of California Probate
Code section 150(a)(3), rather than California Civil Code sections 1091, 1624. CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a)(3).
But see Comment, Oral Transmutation of Separate Property: California's Law by Dicta, 9 STAN. L. REV. 183,
185-86 (1956) (arguing that the rule allowing the executed oral agreement exception to the statute of frauds
originated and was perpetuated mainly by questionable dicta).
68. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1733, see. 1-4, at 6301-02 (adding CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5110.710-.740, effective
Jan. 1, 1985) (reenacted by CAL FAM. CODE §§ 850-53); see CAL. FAM. CODE § 852 Comment (West 1994)
(noting that when section 850 was enacted in 1984, the provision overruled previous case law); LAw REVIsION
COMMIssION, Communication of Law Revision Commission Concerning Assembly Bill 2274, 18 CAL L.
REVISION COMM'N REP. 67,67 (1986) [hereinafterAB 2274 Communication] (noting that the legislature enacted
the new transmutation statutes to put into effect the recommendations put forth by the California Law Revision
Commission, in the Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions and Transmutations). The
Commission believed the prior law, which allowed oral transmutations between spouses for the character of
marital property, should be altered to decrease the danger of fraud and increased litigation. LAw REVISION
COMMIssION, Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions and Transmutations, 17 CAL. L.
REVISION COMM'N REP. 213-14 (1984) [hereinafter Recommendation for Transmutations]. Having easy rules
of transmutation generates fraud and increased litigation, the Committee claims, because a spouse may transform
a passing comment into an 'agreement,' or even commit perjury by manufacturing an oral or implied
transmutation. ld. at 214.
69. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852 (West 1994); see Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 273, 794 P.2d 911,
919, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153, 161 (1990) (declaring that the express declaration requirement will not be satisfied by
a spouse signing the consent paragraphs for an IRA account, since the paragraphs did not contain language
which expressly stated that the property's character was being altered); see also Jerry A. Kasner, Donative And
Interspousal Transfers Of Community Property In California: Where We Are (Or Should Be) After MacDonald,
23 PAC. LJ. 361, 393 (1991) (arguing that since the written express declaration requirement of California Civil
Code § 5110.730 [now California Family Code § 852], as interpreted by MacDonald, will likely invalidate many
agreements that do not use appropriate language, the legislature should clarify the form of the necessary
declaration); CAL. FAM. CODE § 851 (West 1994) (noting that transmutations are subject to the laws governing
fraudulent transfers); id. § 853 (West 1994) (stating that a will provision regarding the character of property is
not admissible as evidence of a transmutation if the proceeding is started before the death of the person who
made the will). See generally CAL. CtV. CODE §§ 3439-3449 (West Supp. 1994) (setting out the general laws
regarding fraudulent transfers).
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be valid without meeting the typical contract requirement of
consideration. 70 A discussion of contract law and the duties that spouses
owe each other is necessary to understand Borelli v. Brusseau,7' since the
court relies upon the doctrine of pre-existing duty, and the resulting lack
of consideration, to hold an agreement between a husband and wife will
not be enforced.
2. The Law of Contracts as Applied to California Community
Property Law
While contract law is typically concerned with the exchange of goods
and services, the claim that contracts are foreign to the family context is
false.72 Marriage is essentially a contractual relationship because the
husband and wife mutually owe legally enforceable rights and duties to
each other.73 In particular, the marriage contract has explicit requirements,
such as the duty of support both financially and emotionally.74
70. CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994); see id Comment (West 1994) (stating that when enacted in
1984, California Family Code § 850 codified the basic rule that no consideration is required); infra notes 75-76
and accompanying text (discussing the traditional contract requirements of offer, acceptance, mutual assent, and
consideration).
71. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ist Dist. 1993).
72. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 1994) (stating that marriage is a civil contract between a man and
a woman); see also MARRIAGE CONTRACr, supra note 10, at xv (stating that marriage is the most intimate and
private social relationship, while a contract is typically for the ordering of business transactions); OKIN, supra
note 45, at 122 (stating that marriage has been regarded as a contract for a long time, though courts have not
been willing to enforce contracts among spouses). See generally Mark Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations:
On Surrogate Reasons and Surrogacy Policies, 60 TENN. L. REv. 135, 138 (1992) (arguing that contract law
has its place in family law).
73. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) (finding marriage is like a
contractual relationship because each party has rights and duties, enforceable in court, owed to the other spouse
and the couple's children); see also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 63, 700, 720-721, 750-755, 760-761, 770-772, 781,
783,802-803,850-853,902-903,911-916,920,930-931, 1000, 1100-1103,3900,4301-4302,6321, 6340 (West
1994) (defining the rights and responsibilities of spouses toward each other and their children); MARRIAGE
CONTRACr, supra note 10, at xvii (arguing that marriage is governed by an implicit unwritten contract which
is based upon outmoded assumptions of family).
74. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 1994) (describing the formal requirement of marriage as consent
to the contract, a license, and solemnization as authorized by the code); id § 720 (West 1994) (slating that
mutual obligations of respect, fidelity and support are contracted for between spouses); id. § 4300 (West 1994)
(requiring that every individual shall support his or her spouse); id. § 4301 (West 1994) (requiring a spouse to
financially support the other from the spouse's separate property if there is no community property to support
the couple). The scope of the duty of support is the issue of much litigation. See In re Higgason, 10 Cal, 3d 476,
488, 516 P.2d 289, 297, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1973) (stating that a wife has a duty to pay for her husband's
medical bills out of her own separate property while they live together); Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen,
23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 479, 73 P.2d 643, 645 (lst Dist. 1937) (finding the marriage contract to include nursing
care services); Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347,351, 119 P.2d 970, 973 (2d Dist. 1941) (requiring a wife
to provide nursing care to her husband); infra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Brooks and
Sonnicksen decisions).
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A contract is defined as an exchange of promises, which if breached,
the law gives a remedy.75 To enforce a contract in the case of a breach,
the contract must be supported by consideration.76 An adjunct to the
consideration requirement is the doctrine of pre-existing duty, which is
used by courts to deny the validity of a contract modification." The pre-
existing duty rule states that the promise to do a task that one already has
the legal obligation to do cannot constitute consideration for the return
promise.78 In the family law context, the pre-existing duty rule has been
used by courts to invalidate contracts between a husband and wife, on the
basis that the wife already has the duty by virtue of the marriage contract
75. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 1, at 5; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1549 (West 1982) (defining
a contract as an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing); id. § 1550 (West 1982) (setting forth four essential
elements for a contract to be valid: persons capable of contracting, their consent, a lawful object, and
consideration).
76. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 22 (stating that offer and acceptance are also required for a
valid contract as part of mutual assent); id. § 71 (noting that consideration is a performance or a bargained for
return promise); see also In re Owen, 303 S.E.2d 351, 353 (N.C. 1983) (noting that in a contract, consideration
is the 'glue' that holds the parties together). A legal detriment to the promisee, such as promising to refrain from
doing something that one has the right to do, or promising to do something that one does not have to do, is the
essence of the consideration requirement. See CAL Civ. CODE § 1605 (West 1982) (describing consideration
as encompassing either a benefit to be conferred upon the promisor, or a prejudice suffered by the promisee as
an inducement to the promisor); In re Thomson's Estate, 165 Cal. 290, 296-97, 131 P. 1045, 1048 (1913)
(holding that forbearance is good consideration for a contract); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891)
(defining legal detriment as either doing something that one was not previously obligated to do, or forbearance
from something that one has the legal right to do); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 71(2) (defining
bargain as a promise sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and given in exchange for that
promise); id. § 71(3) (stating that a performance which can constitute consideration may be an act or a
forbearance); id §§ 82-94 (allowing exceptions to the formal contract requirements, such as contracts formed
without consideration, e.g. detrimental reliance, and the promise to pay a debt). Virtually anything that would
be bargained for in exchange for a promise can constitute consideration for that promise, typically including a
return promise. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 2.3 (stating that the bargain theory of consideration
provides that nearly anything can be adequate consideration, if it is part of a bargain); id (setting out that a
bilateral contract is created when there are promises made by both parties).
77. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 4.21 (finding that the pre-existing duty rule has been broadly
applied to a number of contract modification situations). For example, promises to pay construction contractors
more for the same work have been held to be within the pre-existing duty rule. Id.; see also Edwin W. Patterson,
An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L REV. 929, 936 (1958) (noting judicial hostility to the pre-existing
duty rule and stating that the rule has done more than anything else to disparage the doctrine of consideration).
But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (stating that consideration is not necessary for an interspousal
transmutation of property); supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing California Family Code § 850
and its lack of a consideration requirement).
78. See Grant v. The Aerodraulics Co., 91 Cal. App. 2d 68, 75, 204 P.2d 683, 687 (2d Dist. 1949)
(declaring a uniform rule of law to be that a promise to do what one is already under a legal obligation to do
is not sufficient consideration to support a new contract); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 4.21, at 449 (stating
that it is not valid consideration to promise to do something that the promisee already has an obligation to do).
Professor Farnsworth also notes that the pre-existing duty rule applies to duties imposed by law, as well as by
contract. Ud. at 450. See Grant v. Green, 41 Iowa 88, 92 (1887) (stating that a wife had a statutory duty to care
for her insane husband); see also Foakes v. Beer, App. Cas. 605, 630 (1884) (affirming the common law pre-
existing duty rule).
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to do what she later agreed to do.79 Courts have defined the duties
required by wives very broadly over time, however, and as a result have
refused to enforce agreements between spouses for the performance of
domestic duties in exchange for compensation.8" Thus, the wife's
promise, usually a promise for domestic services, has not been found to
constitute consideration for the return promise of remuneration made by
the husband.8
The California Legislature has sought to define not only the division
of marital property, but also the very rights and duties spouses owe to each
other.82 Rights and duties proscribed by statutes include the requirements
that: every individual is to support his or her spouse;83 a husband and
wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and
support;84 and finally, that a married person must support his or her
79. See Youngberg v. Holstrom, 108 N.W.2d 498, 500, 502 (Iowa 1961) (refusing to enforce an
agreement between husband and wife that provided for the wife to receive compensation for her services upon
the husband's farm, including raising poultry and hogs); Frame v. Frame, 36 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. 1931)
(disallowing a service contract between husband and wife regarding the wife's participation in the husband's
business); infra notes 243-251 and accompanying text (noting caring for an ill spouse cannot comprise
consideration to support an agreement that seeks to exchange the nursing care service for property, the Borelli
court held, since nursing care is a duty that is already created by the marriage contract).
80. See, e.g., Mathews v. Mathews, 162 S.E.2d 697,698 (N.C. 1968) (holding that caring for a husband's
sick relatives was required of a wife as a marital duty, and denying her compensation); MARRIAGc CONTRACT,
supra note 10, at 340 (finding that courts have included all the labor a woman has put forth in any family
enterprise, such as the home, the farm, and the family business, as owing to her husband from the marital
contract in order to void domestic service contracts). Professor Weitzman, however, states that there is little
rational or legal basis for courts not enforcing agreements among spouses for domestic services. Id. Instead,
Weitzman suspects that courts have used rationales like the agreement being void due to it being against public
policy or a lack of consideration, to refuse to enforce domestic service agreements where the court doubts its
validity for different reasons. Id. For instance, the court may believe that the agreement never existed, and so
it would be unjust to enforce the contract. Id.; see also infra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (setting out
the traditional duties of a wife as interpreted by the courts in Sonnicksen and Brooks); infra notes 280-284 and
accompanying text (discussing the Borelli holding, where the court refused to enforce an oral agreement for
nursing care duties performed by the wife in exchange for transmutation of the husband's separate property).
81. See, e.g., Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 475,479, 73 P.2d 643, 645 (1st Dist.
1937) (finding an implied term of the marriage contract to be that a wife is to provide nursing care to her
husband); Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (2d Dist. 1941) (holding that
domestic services are part of the wife's duty as per her marital status); see also infra notes 87-129 and
accompanying text (discussing the California courts' traditional approach to a wife's duty).
82. See CAl.. FAM. CODE § 4300 (West 1994) (stating that spouses must support each other); id. § 720
(West 1994) (noting that spouses have the obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support); id. § 4301 (West
1994) (mandating that one support one's spouse out of one's own separate property if there exists no community
property, subject to California Family Code § 914); id. § 914 (West 1994) (allowing creditors to reach the
separate property of the non-debtor spouse, even if community property funds of the couple exist).
83. Id. § 4300 (West 1994).
84. Id. § 720 (West 1994).
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spouse while they are living together.85 The rationale given for the
spousal duty legislation is that marriage is an important state interest
because the marriage relation is the basis of the family and the family is
the foundation of society.86
In addition to legislatively created duties between husband and wife,
the courts have also defined what spousal duties exist. 7 For example,
California courts have traditionally found that a wife has a marital duty to
personally provide nursing care services. In Estate of Sonnicksen v.
Sonnicksen,88 the Court of Appeal for the First District of California
established the law regarding a wife's duty to care for her ill husband.89
The plaintiff in Sonnicksen, Martha Sullivan, sued the recipients of the
estate of her deceased husband, Andrew Sonnicksen.'O The spouses
agreed in writing, about a year and a half before their marriage, that
Martha would provide personal nursing care services for Andrew if he
would convey to her some property before he died.91 Martha also agreed
to give up her practice as a professional nurse.92 Martha and Andrew later
married and lived together until Andrew died three years later.93 Andrew,
however, did not convey the property as promised in the written agreement
85. Id. § 4301 (West 1994). California Family Code § 4301 is subject to § 914, which provides that third
party creditors can reach the separate property of the non-debtor spouse, even if there exists community property
funds. Id. § 914 (West 1994).
86. Rehfuss v. Rehfuss, 169 Cal. 86, 92, 145 P. 1020, 1022 (1915); see Haas v. Haas, 227 Cal. App. 2d
615, 617, 38 Cal. Rptr 811. 812-13 (2d Dist. 1964) (noting that the public, through the state, has an interest in
the formation and dissolution of the marriage relationship). But see Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557
P.2d 106, 109-10, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818-19 (1976) (identifying a social trend since the 1960's towards
cohabitation without marriage, with an increase in litigation regarding cohabitation relationship issues).
87. See Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 119 P.2d 970, 972-973 (2d Dist. 1941) (holding
nursing care services to be incidental to a wife's statutory duty); Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal.
App. 2d 475, 479, 73 P.2d 643, 645 (lst Dist. 1937) (declaring that nursing care services are an implied part
of the marital bargain, and they are to be performed by the wife without compensation); infra notes 89-129 and
accompanying text (discussing the Brooks and Sonnicksen cases in detail).
88. 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643 (Ist Dist. 1937).
89. I4, at 479, 73 P.2d at 645; see id. (holding that a wife has a duty to care for her ill husband).
90. Id at 475, 73 P.2d at 644.
91. Id at 476-78, 73 P.2d at 644-45. The Sonnicksen court stated that the contract was not made in
contemplation of marriage, so the contract did not concern any marital duties. Id. at 479, 73 P.2d at 645. The
court did not give any details as to how much the property was worth, only describing the property at issue as
being some real property and an automobile. Id. at 477, 73 P.2d at 644.
92. Id at 477, 73 P.2d at 644. The agreement set forth that Andrew had the option of paying Martha
$100 a month for the nursing care if he so decided. Id at 477, 73 P.2d at 644. The court stated that the $100
was never paid. Id. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the various provisions of the contract were
valid, choosing to simply characterize the agreement as a service contract. Id at 478, 73 P.2d at 645. In addition,
Martha's daughter was allowed to reside in the common home they shared, and Martha and Andrew were each
to pay half of the family expenses. Id. at 476-78, 73 P.2d at 644-45.
93. Id at 479, 73 P.2d at 645.
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and Martha sued in probate court for specific performance of the
agreement.
94
The probate court denied Martha's petition, and the Court of Appeal
for the First District of California affirmed the decision.95 Andrew's
children, the recipients of Andrew's estate, contended that the marriage
contract superseded the agreement at issue, which was not enforceable. 96
The Sonnicksen court agreed, stating that one of the implied terms in a
marriage contract is that a wife is to perform nursing care services without
compensation.97 The court, however, did not give any cases to support
this broad proposition.98 Nevertheless, the Sonnicksen court held the
nursing care contract invalid because its terms were inconsistent with the
implied terms in the marriage contract, requiring Martha to provide
Andrew with nursing care services without compensation."
Apart from Sonnicksen, courts also have the power to refuse to enforce
marital contracts on the basis that they violate public policy)"" Courts
generally refuse to enforce contracts on policy grounds because they do
not want to sanction undesirable conduct, or that enforcement of an
unsavory agreement is an improper use of judicial power.,' To
determine what is public policy, courts often look to legislative enactments
of what is illegal, such as gambling or usury. 2 When a public policy is
not so clear-cut as to be codified, the court's decision rests upon a
balancing test, weighing the factors for and against enforcement of the
94. Id
95. See idt (finding no error by the probate court).
96. Id The court of appeal found it unnecessary to discuss other arguments made by the defendants, since
their contention that the marriage contract terminated the first agreement, was sustained by the court. Id.
97. Id; see Sonnicksen v. Estate of Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 480, 73 P.2d 646 (lst Dist. 1937)
(companion case to Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen) (denying a wife's quantum meruit claim for the
reasonable value of her services while providing nursing care services to a husband on the same theory).
98. See Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 475,479,73 P.2d 643, 645 (1st Dist. 1937)
(giving no support for the proposition that the duty of a wife to perform nursing care services is inherent in the
marriage contract). The Sonnicksen court does cite 30 CJ. 520, but there are no California cases cited therein.
99. See idt (citing In re Callister's Estate, 47 N.E. 268 (N.Y. 1897)) (requiring the termination of a
contract which has a term that is inconsistent with a term of the marriage contract).
100. 2 FARNswORTH, supra note 14, § 5.1; see Stemaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763,764
(N.Y. 1902) (maintaining that the power to contract has its limits, such that parties cannot create an enforceable
contract that violates the law or public policy).
101. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 5.1; see Bank of the United States v. Owen, 27 U.S. 527, 538-39
(1829) (affirming the notion that a court cannot be the servant of wickedness).
102. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 5.1; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-2 (West 1985) (outlawing usury,
which is charging interest of more than $12 per each $100 borrowed).
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agreement.'0 3 The public policy at issue in marital contract cases such
as Borelli v. Brusseau""° and Brooks v. Brooks,'0 5 is the policy against
the impairment of family relations.'t 6
Four years after Sonnicksen was decided, the Court of Appeal for the
Second District of California also held that a wife has a duty to provide
personal nursing care services for her husband.10 7 In Brooks v.
Brooks,08 the appellate court held that a prior oral contract for nursing
care services was voided by the marriage of the parties on public policy
grounds.'09 James Brooks employed his future wife, Bessie, to be his
nurse for eighty dollars a month.1 Bessie nursed James as agreed upon
for over four years, then told James that she would leave him unless he
married her."' Bessie and James then agreed that Bessie would ask for
nothing after marriage except for room, board and compensation of eighty
dollars each month for the services. 2 James paid Bessie the agreed upon
eighty dollars per month until she left of her own volition nearly four
years after they married. 1 3 James sued to recover the $3,630 he had paid
Bessie while married.14 The trial court sustained the wife's demurrer to
the complaint, but James appealed, and the Court of Appeal for the Second
District of California heard his appeal.'
In Brooks, the court of appeal began by stating the rule that a married
woman cannot contract with her husband for domestic services which are
incidental to her marital status, since such contracts are against public
103. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 5.1 (setting forth some factors in favor of enforcement, such
as protecting the expectations of the parties to the contract, and whether a forfeiture will result if enforcement
is denied). Some factors against enforcement for a court to examine include the strength of the public policy
involved, and the likelihood that refusal of enforcement will further the public policy. Id.
104. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993).
105. 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 119 P. 2d 970 (2d Dist. 1941).
106. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 5.4 (stating the policy at issfie with contracts set in the marital
sphere are the result of the notion that the marriage relation is at the foundation of our civilization).
107. See Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 119 P.2d 970, 973 (2d Dist. 1941) (holding that
nursing care services are incidental to the wife's spousal duty and that a contract for compensation based on
those services is void as against public policy).
108. 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 119 P.2d 970 (2d Dist. 1941).
109. See id., at 351, 119 P.2d at 972-73 (stating that the wife was already bound to render the nursing care
services, and thus her promise to provide the services could not constitute consideration for the husband's return
promise of remuneration).
110. Id. at 348, 119 P.2d at 971. James was totally paralyzed from the waist down. Id. The agreement also
provided room and board for Bessie and her son. Id
111. Id. at 348-49, 119 P.2d at 971.
112. ld. at 349, 119 P.2d at 971. Bessie also promised to continue as nurse and housekeeper. Id.
113. d. Bessie moved away from the house she shared with her husband after she left the marriage. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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policy." 6 The court noted the reason behind the public policy rule is that
domestic services are owed by a wife to her husband as part of the marital
duty. 17  Since the wife cannot perform these services on her own
account, no contract can exist for them."8 Thus, if the law were to give
effect to intraspousal agreements for domestic services, like nursing care,
there would be three problems." 9 First, recognizing the ability of the
wife to contract for her services would be disruptive to the marriage. 2
Second, a wife's contract for services would degrade the wife by making
her a menial servant."' Finally, the court recognized that the spouses
could defraud creditors who hold a claim against the husband.' The
court asserted that husband and wife could secretly contract for services,
which would enable the husband to pass all of his property to his wife and
to avoid the creditor's claim, in exchange for her domestic services. 2 3
The Brooks court then stated that there was no legislative enactment
which allowed spouses to contract with each other in regard to domestic
services. 124 In support of this, the court cited California Civil Code
section 159, which states that a husband and wife cannot alter their legal
relations by contract, except as they relate to property. 25 Then, without
explanation, the court stated that it was obvious that nursing a sick or
116. See id at 349-50, 119 P.2d at 972 (citing Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 175,
73 P.2d 643 (1st Dist. 1937)) (noting that public policy considerations mandate the prohibition of wives from
contracting for services which are part of the marital contract); supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text
(detailing the rule that courts refuse to enforce contracts that violate public policy); infra notes 243-249 and
accompanying text (discussing the public policy rationale in Borelli for refusing to enforce agreements between
husband and wife for domestic services).
117. See Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972 (stating that a wife owes domestic services to
her husband's family, in addition to the husband himself); Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883) (providing
the rationale for the public policy rule that strikes down intraspousal agreements regarding the remuneration of
nursing care services).
118. See Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972 (declaring that home services are rendered for
the household, and not the woman personally).
119. id
120. Id; Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883) (stating, without explanation, that the ability of a wife
to sue her husband would cause discord and adversely affect marital harmony).
121. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972; see Coleman, 93 N.Y. at 25 (explaining that a wife
should discharge her domestic duties lovingly and with great care, not with the attitude of hired help).
122. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972; see Coleman, 93 N.Y. at 25 (determining that to
allow a husband and wife to contract for domestic services would greatly facilitate creditor fraud).
123. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972; see Coleman, 93 N.Y. at 25 (explaining that by
secret and unknown contracts a wife could acquire all of her husband's property as payment of her services,
thereby preventing the husband's creditors from satisfying their debts).
124. See Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972 (finding no California statute permitting the
spouses to contract for domestic services).
125. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 159 (recodified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 1620 (West 1994)) (allowing a husband
and wife to alter by contract their property arrangements).
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invalid spouse is part of one's marital duties.'26 The Brooks court thus
concluded that nursing care services are not encompassed by the property
exception found in California Civil Code section 159.127
In accordance with these rules, the Brooks court held that the husband
had stated a claim since the renewed agreement, which called for payment
of services that were part of the marriage bargain, was void as against
public policy.' Therefore, the Brooks court did not give effect to an
agreement between husband and wife, to the detriment of the woman,
further illustrating how women's legal interests have not been given the
same protection as men over time. 9
B. The Historical Background of Female Subordination by the Law
The legal subordination of women can be traced back to common law
when a married woman was seen as the property of her husband. 3 ° At
that time, a woman was legally not able to make a contract, a will, own
property, have control of her separate estate, or control her own body.'
The common law also allowed a husband to physically discipline his wife,
126. See Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972 (indicating that housekeeping and nursing of
an ill spouse are incidents of marriage); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 1620 (West 1994) (rejecting the ability of
spouses to contract out of their legal duties to each other, except as to property); idl § 3580 (providing that
mutual consent is sufficient consideration for a support agreement after separation).
127. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 119 P.2d at 972.
128. d at 351, 119 P.2d at 972-73. The appellate court in Brooks reversed the trial court, holding that
the wife's demurrer to the complaint was improperly sustained. Id. The court also upheld the husband's claim
because there was no consideration for the promise to pay Bessie. l
129. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 151 (noting that throughout the history of the United States,
women have been denied basic rights of citizenship, allowed only limited participation in the economy, and also
have been denied access to power, dignity, and respect).
130. See BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the concept of women as property is one idea that led
to the subordination of women in the United States); MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 9 (indicating that
married women today still experience a loss of their independent identity when they marry). The loss of identity
married women experience is demonstrated when the woman takes the last name of her husband, instead of
retaining her maiden name. Id By taking the last name of her husband, a woman discards the life she had
previously led, and becomes identified with the husband. Id A woman, however, is not required by law to take
her husband's surname. Id.
131. See BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 1 (recognizing that because women were thought of as property, their
legal existence was virtually suspended); 1 Wn.LiAM BLACKsroNE, COMMENTARIES *442 (noting that during
marriage, at common law in England, the husband and wife merged into a single legal entity and therefore could
not contract between each other); Joseph Warren, Husband's Right To Wife's Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421,
421 (1925) (asserting that at common law, a husband had the right to his wife's services whether rendered to
him in the home or business, or whether rendered to a third party).
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as part of the husband's authority.'32 The most enduring reason for the
subordinate status of women was the assumption that men represent what
a human being is supposed to be, and since women are different, they are
therefore considered lesser beings.133
The relationship between husband and wife at common law was altered
by the Married Women's Property Acts.'4 These enactments, which
allowed a woman to own property and control her own separate property,
were enacted in all common law property states around 1900.135 In
California, however, a woman already had the rights granted by the
Married Women's Property Acts, such as being able to contract with her
husband, own separate property, and keep her earnings as her own while
living apart from the husband, because California had adopted the com-
munity property scheme.3 6 Nonetheless, some commentators argue that
132. See State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 60 (1874) (rejecting the common law "rule of thumb" that a husband
could harm his wife if he did not use a stick wider than his thumb); 1 BLACKsToNE, supra note 131, *444
(stating that the common law found it reasonable for a husband to beat his wife, since he had to answer for his
wife's actions). Though domestic violence is not condoned explicitly by the law today, domestic violence is still
prevalent. Ross, supra note 6, at 154. In the United States, domestic violence is the greatest cause of injury to
women, with 20% of emergency room visits by women the result of injuries caused by battering, and 31% of
all female homicide victims in 1988 killed by their husbands or boyfriends. lit; see Diana Griego Erwin, Bobbitt
Case an Expose of Domestic Abuse, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 25, 1994, at A2 (noting that in California in 1992,
police responded to 248,828 domestic violence calls, and that more than one million American women a year
are forcibly raped by their husbands).
133. See BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 1-2 (summarizing the assumption that men are the norm and women
are different). This assumption, however, ignores the fact that the human species consists of both male and
female animals, which together comprise and represent mankind, and is not just one species without
differentiation. See DRUCLLA CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS-RECOLLECTIVE IMAGINATION AND SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE 141 (1993) (arguing that men and women should be given equal value despite their biological
differences). Cornell also claims that affirming the feminine sexual difference is necessary to changing the status
quo, without reducing the claim for women's rights to an appeal for special privilege. Id.
134. See BLUMBERG, supra note 37, at 3 (noting that the Married Women's Property Acts are a generic
term for statutes passed circa 1900 in all the common law states).
135. See id (explaining that all common law states passed Married Women's Property Acts); see, e.g., Ga.
Code Ann. § 2993 (1914); Mich. Comp. Laws § 11485 (1915) (giving a woman the right to own property in
her own name and control her separate property). The United States Supreme Court, however, held that the
District of Columbia's Married Women's Property Act did not give a woman the right to her earnings from
outside work. Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U.S. 580, 584 (1876).
136. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (reenacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 158 (1872)) (West 1994) (allowing
spouses to contract with each other as if they were unmarried); CAL. CIV. CODE § 168 (1872), repealed by 1974
Cal. Stat., ch. 1206, § 3 at 2609 (stating that a wife's earnings are not subject to her husband's debts); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 771 (reenacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 169 (1872)) (West 1994) (granting a wife the right to her
earnings while living separate and apart from her spouse). While community property dictates that earnings of
both spouses during the marriage are community property, until 1975 only the husband had the right to manage
and control the community estate. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 172 (1872) (placing management and control of the
community property estate solely with the husband); id. § 172a (1872) (reaffirming that the husband has
management and control, but the wife must join a conveyance of community real property). But see CAL. FAM,
CODE § 1100 (West 1994) (stating that both spouses have equal right to manage and control the community
property).
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even when women were finally given the right to manage and control their
own property under the Married Women's Property Acts and in community
property states, other inequities still persisted due to the division of society
into two spheres.'37 A legal tradition evolved which recognized that the
world was split into public and private spheres, with women segregated
into the private sphere where the legal ideals of equality and justice do not
apply. 3 ' In particular, feminists claim that women are relegated to the
private sphere, while men are placed in the public sphere. 139 The private
sphere includes family, home, and child raising.14 The public sphere
constitutes government, business, and the law.14 ' The separate spheres
theory is used to explain the exclusion of women from the political and
economic spheres, and the resulting dependent and subservient roles. 42
There are two assumptions that logically lead to the conclusion that
women should be at home, under the authority and protection of their
husband.' 43 The first assumption is that since women give birth to
children, it is necessary that women be the primary child rearer.' 44 In
addition, it is assumed that women are physically, mentally, and morally
inferior to men, and therefore they are unfit to participate in public
life.145 The relegation of women to the private sphere has resulted in the
marginalization of their existence.' This marginalization is due to the
fact that the private realm, in today's modern post-industrial society, has
137. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (stating that the civil law, as well as nature, has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of men and women); Carole
Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281
(Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983) (arguing that the feminist movement is ultimately about the
dichotomy between the public and private spheres); Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 152-54 (citing denial
of the franchise, full participation in the economy, limitation of occupational choices, and denial of the right to
reproductive choice as examples of the inequality between men and women); infra notes 152-156 and
accompanying text (describing the limitation of occupations that women suffer).
138. Powers, supra note 4, at 70.
139. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 151 (noting that the law has explicitly excluded women from
the public sphere and confined them to the private sphere).
140. BARTLET, supra note 2, at 2; see Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 151-52 (detailing the woman's
primary responsibilities in the private realm to include bearing and raising children and providing a refuge for
men from the pressures of the capitalist world).
141. BARTL T,', supra note 2, at 2; see Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 151 (defining the public sphere
as containing the marketplace and government).
142. See BARTLErr, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing that the exclusion of women from political and economic
importance is due to women's relegation to the private sphere).
143. Powers, supra note 4, at 72.
144. lId
145. lad at 72-73.
146. See Gavison, supra note 8, at 22 (identifying the privatization of women leading to their
marginalization as being the 'first' claim of feminists).
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become increasingly limited and impoverished.147 In particular, the
private realm excludes politics and work that is financially rewarding,
since it concerns only homemaking and childrearing, neither of which earn
a wage. 48 Women's lives are also preoccupied with the provision of
domestic services, which limits the amount of time left in the day to enter
the public sphere. 49
There are many examples of how the law has excluded women from
public life with the denial of certain rights. 50 There is the denial of the
right to vote.' Even though women were given the right to vote in
1920, with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, women were not
automatically given all the rights and duties that normally accompany
elector status. 52 Women were denied the right to hold an elected or
appointed office,'53 the right, if married, to conduct a business, 54 and
147. See id. (finding that the private realm does not contain good work, but rather denies women rewarding
lives, independence, and visibility).
148. See id. (noting that women are expected to take primary responsibility for childrearing, and other
unpaid services in the home, while men are to be the major breadwinners). In addition, if a woman reaches a
freely agreed upon contract with her spouse, in an attempt to receive compensation for the many services she
provides at home, courts strike down the agreements as being void as against public policy, stating that support
encompasses part of the marriage bargain. See Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 119 P.2d 970, 972
(2d Dist. 1941) (holding that an agreement for the payment for nursing care services is void, since the services
are part of the marriage contract); Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 479, 73 P.2d 643,
645 (1st Dist. 1937) (denying enforcement of an agreement concerning property in exchange for the provision
of nursing care services, on the ground that a wife is to perform such services without compensation); supra
notes 87-129 and accompanying text (discussing Brooks and Sonnicksen).
149. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 151-52 (finding opportunities for women limited in the public
sphere by their obligations at home in the private sphere).
150. See Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2872 (1992) (noting that women's right
to control their reproductive lives, recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has facilitated women's
ability to equally participate in the economic and social life of our society); Taub & Schneider, supra note 9,
at 152-54 (citing denial of franchise, exclusion from participating fully in the economy, and loss of reproductive
control). The denial of full reproductive autonomy limits a woman's work and educational opportunities, since
a woman does not possess the ability to determine when she will have children, and women bear the childrearing
responsibilities. Ia4 at 158-59.
151. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 152 (claiming that the refusal to recognize the right of women
to vote is the most obvious exclusion of women from the public sphere); Ross, supra note 6, at xiii (noting that
at the 1848 Seneca Falls women's rights convention, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott listed the ability
to vote as the 'first right of a citizen').
152. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (providing that no one may be denied the right to vote on account of
sex); Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 152 (stating that the Nineteenth Amendment passed only after a century
long struggle). See generally ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE - THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MovEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES (1975 ed.) (giving a general account of women's demands for inclusion and recognition
within the legal system, from Colonial American times culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment).
153. See Powers, supra note 4, 71 n.68 (stating the common law rule that women could not hold office
or take part in the administration of justice).
154. Id. at 71.
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the right to hold certain occupations. 5 5 Furthermore, as late as 1961, the
United States Supreme Court upheld a woman's exclusion from jury
duty.
156
While the law has directed male dominance in the public sphere, the
law has been noticeably absent from the private sphere. 57 For instance,
courts are reluctant to enforce agreements between spouses, or adjudicate
interspousal disputes. 58 Courts traditionally have not enforced agree-
ments between husbands and wives for domestic services. 5 9 An example
155. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,467 (1948) (upholding a state statute which prohibited women
from bartending, unless their husband or father owned the bar); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873)
(maintaining the Illinois state supreme court's refusal to admit women to practice law).
156. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (holding the exclusion of women from jury duty
reasonable, since women are still the center of home and family life), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875) (holding that the right to vote was not one of the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, thereby upholding a state constitutional provision that
specifically prohibited women from voting); see also Ross, supra note 6, at xiv (noting that women's rights
activists pushed for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution in the 1970's,
due to the prevalence of discriminatory laws against women). The Equal Rights Amendment stated that neither
any state nor the United States shall deny equality of rights under the law on account of sex. Id. The amendment
failed to be ratified by the necessary thirty-eight states by a narrow margin. Id. See generally MARY A.
DELSMAN, EVERYTHING You NEED To KNow ABOUT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENMENT (1975) (placing the
Equal Rights Amendment in historical context, and setting out the arguments as to what the amendment will and
will not do).
157. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 154 (noting that the law, by not interfering in the private
sphere, operates subtly to subordinate women, since women are relegated to the private sphere); see also Doe
v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Mass. 1974) (stating that the many delicate questions inherent in a marriage are
generally left alone by the law).
158. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624, 639 (1980) (noting
that inter-spousal disputes have long received a hands-off approach from the law); see also Powers, supra note
4, at 70-73 (asserting that this tradition of family autonomy subordinates wives to their husbands); Taub &
Schneider, supra note 9, at 154 (arguing that even though the conflicts between parties are fundamentally the
same in the public and private sphere, the law generally refuses to interfere in ongoing family relationships).
Examples of the similarities between the public and private spheres can be drawn from contract law, tort law,
and criminal law. Id at 154-55. Contract law purportedly has the purpose to enforce promissory obligations
between individuals, and yet is not available during marriage to enforce agreements between the spouses
regarding matters that do not involve property, such as nursing care agreements. Id at 155. Also, tort law
traditionally has not been applicable to injuries inflicted by one family member on another that would be
compensable but for the fact that they occurred in the private family setting, due to interspousal and parent-child
immunity. I. Many state rape statutes continue to carve out an exception for a husband's forced intercourse with
his wife. Id
159. See e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 119 P.2d 970, 972-973 (2d Dist. 1941)
(nursing care services); Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 479, 73 P.2d 643, 645 (1st
Dist. 1937) (nursing care services); Youngberg v. Holstrom, 108 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa- 1961) (services on
husband's farm); Frame v. Frame, 36 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. 1931) (looking after the farm, marketing products,
and collecting and paying out money); supra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Brooks and
Sonnicksen cases in detail).
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is the agreement for nursing care services.' 60 When a court does not
enforce an agreement that requires the husband to compensate the wife for
services she has already provided, an injustice is worked against the
woman.' 61 Courts which justify their refusal to intervene in intra-family
disputes often invoke the image of the family as a private domain which
should be free from government interference. 62
Using privacy to justify noninterference in the family translates to
deregulation of marriage in the name of individual liberty. 6 The
deregulation actually makes liberty and equality more elusive, since liberty
and equality mean little absent some mechanism for enforcement within
the family.'64 The effect of courts' adherence to privacy notions, there-
160. See Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 351, 119 P.2d at 972 (holding that an agreement among husband and
wife for nursing care services violates public policy, since such services are incidental to the wife's spousal
duties); Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d at 479, 73 P.2d at 645 (noting that since a wife is to perform nursing care
services without compensation, there cannot be a contract for the wife to be paid for these same services); supra
notes 87-129 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the Brooks and Sonnicksen courts' holding that
nursing care services are a wife's duty).
161. See MARRIAcE CONTRACr, supra note 10, at 72 (stating that a married woman cannot get receive
compensation for her services that she has already rendered, due to the insurmountable barrier that the law places
in front of married women). Courts have not enforced spousal agreements for domestic services based upon a
perceived lack of consideration. Id. at 71. Commentators, however, have noted that the finding of a lack of
consideration is simply a tool that courts use to inject their own views. See Dalton, supra note 22, at 1011
(arguing that the entire doctrine of consideration is used by courts to make policy decisions about which
agreements to enforce and which to not enforce); infra notes 243-251 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding in BoreilO.
162. See Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571, 579 (1919) (refusing to enforce, between spouses, a written
agreement for the husband to send support money to his ailing wife on the ground that the state should not
interfere in an ongoing marriage). The policy of nonintervention states that the law is not to intrude into the
ongoing family relationship, since people will act out of love and cooperation, and thus there is no need for legal
interference. See Gavison, supra note 8, at 23 '(setting out the claim by some that there is no need for legal
interference in the family, since familial and common interests will ensure the welfare of all concerned), An
alternate reason for the public-private distinction is that the market and business world is harsh, while the family
is filled with a harmony of interests and love. Id It follows that men are stronger and thus volunteer to face the
cruel world. Id While the worlds of business and politics may be rough, feminists argue that it is a source of
self-fulfillment which is systematically denied to most women. Id.
163. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 95 (1989) (arguing that the traditional approach of nonintervention
has been reinforced by recent decisions, such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which raises the
right of marital privacy to a constitutional level, signaling the withdrawal of regulation from an ongoing
marriage); id. (arguing that the ideas of privacy and neutrality allow the law to avoid the appearance of imposing
any one group's views upon another group).
164. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 155 (arguing that the notion of a familial privacy right is
based on false assumptions). Taub and Schneider state that claims for privacy misconstrue the point at which
the law is brought into the family situation. Id. Since the parties seek legal relief after the harmony of the family
is disrupted, there is no additional disruption that the law causes by its intrusion, and harmonious relations are
no longer possible. Id. at 155-56. This same argument is discussed in the Borelli dissent. See Borelli, 12 Cal.
App. 4th at 657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (claiming that those who favor domestic harmony
over intrusion by the court are in retreat across the country, because there are obvious wrongs that need to be
addressed). In addition, there is no marriage relationship to preserve when one spouse has died, such as occurred
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fore, is to ratify or allocate the power of one family member over
another.' 65 Thus, by not allowing women to enforce agreements that
were made between spouses as consenting adults, courts send the message
that household work is not real work, since it is not a proper subject for
a contract.'6 Because the law has so little to do with women's concerns,
the insignificance of women becomes underscored and has been
perpetuated through modem times. 67 Even though women have moved
out of the home and into the working world in great numbers, women have
still not achieved equality with their male counterparts because of the legal
subordination. 6 '
C. While Women Have Substantially Achieved Legal Equality, Women
are Still Kept from True Equality
Equality is a long honored value of the Anglo-American legal
tradition.' 69 At a minimum, equality means equal application of the law
to all people. 70 We have seen that women have not always been treated
as equals with men before the law.' Over time, however, all the statutes
and court opinions which denied women the right to participate in the
in Borelli, so the familial privacy argument is not applicable. Id. at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22-23.
165. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1174-75 (1985)
(claiming that the practical consequence of a court refusing to settle intra-spousal financial disputes is to leave
the parties in the position that they are). Affirming the status quo, however, allocates power in the husband, since
he usually is the one who makes household decisions. Id. at 1175; see Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 156
(arguing that isolating women to the private sphere, where the law does not enter, contributes directly to
women's inferior status). Since the law does not enter the private sphere, women do not have access to the legal
relief needed to improve their situation. Id. In addition, by not adjudicating men's conduct in the private realm,
the law sanctions the rule of men. Id
166. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 156 (claiming that the portrayal of women's work as not
being real work maintains a woman's subordinate status, since it devalues her worth).
167. See id. (noting the image that the law is for business and other important things, thus, implying that
women's concerns about spousal support, household duties, and provision of nursing care are not important);
supra notes 150-166 and accompanying text (illustrating how the law excludes women from the public sphere
yet gives women no assistance in the private sphere).
168. See OKIN, supra note 45, at 3 (arguing that there exists substantial inequality between the sexes even
today).
169. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasizing the importance of justice, along with the blessings of liberty);
id. amend. XIV, § 1 (announcing that no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws); The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (advancing the first examination of the Fourteenth Amendment);
OKIN, supra note 45, at 3 (finding that the Pledge of Allegiance also claims to bestow 'liberty and justice for
all'); Powers, supra note 4, at 68 (proclaiming that a basic principle of the United States is the inherent equality
of all people); Ross, supra note 6, at 2 (finding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits an action by
government from treating citizens differently, or singling out one group for special treatment over another
group); Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 151 (stating that equality is a value of our legal tradition).
170. Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 151.
171. See supra notes 130-168 and accompanying text (detailing the historical subordination of women).
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public sphere have been reversed. 72 Women can now vote, serve on
juries, and hold elected or appointed offices. 173 Equal access to public
accommodations, housing, credit, insurance, education, athletics, govern-
ment benefits, and pension plans are also all guaranteed to women.
74
Despite these reforms, however, there still exist legal barriers to women's
full participation in the public sphere. 75 For example, the doctrine of
separate but equal for the different sexes has been approved in government
education by the United States Supreme Court in Vorchheimer v. School
District of Philadelphia.76 In contrast, the 1954 decision of Brown v.
Board of Education rejected the separate but equal doctrine in the racial
context.1 77 Vorchheimer and Brown exemplify the United States Supreme
Court's application of equal protection, with a result that race-based
172. Powers, supra note 4, at 79.
173. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (allowing women the right to vote); 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. 1993)
(providing that all citizens, with limited exceptions, are competent to sit on federal juries; Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding a state statute that exempted women automatically from jury service, unless they
volunteered, as violating the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial trial); In re Opinion of the Justices,
135 N.E. 173, 176 (Mass. 1922) (interpreting the Nineteenth Amendment as having the effect of making women
eligible to hold office).
174. Powers, supra note 4, at 79; see Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982 &
Supp. 1993) (making it unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant of a credit transaction
based upon sex); Title XI of the Educational Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1990) (providing that no
person shall be excluded from participation in any educational program receiving federal funds on the basis of
sex); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978) (establishing that no employer who is subject to the
federal minimum wage laws shall discriminate on the basis of sex with regard to the wage rate for equal jobs);
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 292(d) (Supp. 1993) (restricting grants, loan guarantees, or interest subsidy
payments to schools of medicine, optometry, pharmacy, podiatry, or public health to those schools which make
satisfactory assurances that the school will not discriminate on the basis of sex in admissions); Title V11 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (1981) (making it unlawful to refuse to hire, to
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual for employment based upon his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1977 & Supp, 1993) (prohibiting sex
discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing); Unruh Act, CAL CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1994)
(forbidding sex discrimination by business establishments); id § 1812.30-1812.31 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994)
(disallowing sex discrimination in credit, and providing recovery for actual and punitive damages); CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 40,41,51500,51501 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting discrimination based upon sex in schools,
their athletic programs, and use of textbooks that reflect adversely upon people due to race, sex, color, and
handicap); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900-12995 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring that people do not discriminate
against applicants for employment and housing based upon sex); CAL INs. CODE § 10119.5 (West 1993)
(forbidding sex discrimination in insurance for pregnant women).
175. Powers, supra note 4, at 79.
176. See Vorhheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703, 703 (1977) (upholding, without
opinion, Philadelphia's two sex-segregated elite high schools because they were separate but equal).
177. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that having separate educational
systems for white and black children violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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classifications receive a higher standard of judicial review than sex-based
classifications.'78
The lack of true equality between men and women, in the face of
numerous federal and state statutes requiring formal equality, is also
demonstrated by the great economic and political inequality that women
suffer.'79 For example, the poverty rate of elderly woman is nearly twice
that of elderly men.'80 In addition, three-fifths of chronically poor house-
holds with dependent children are headed by a single female parent.'
Women are also underrepresented in the government. 8 2 There are fifty-
five U.S. women representatives in the 1993-94 congressional term, and
until recently, one out of nine Supreme Court Justices was deemed to be
enough female representation in the highest court of the land.' The
inequality women suffer is evidenced by the fact that women are paid less
for the same work and bear most of the burden of the housework and child
178. See Ross, supra note 6, at 6 (noting that in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), the United
States Supreme Court articulated its constitutional standard of review for gender classifications as an intermediate
test, which requires a statute to be substantially related to the achievement of important government objectives);
cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) (holding that race classifications are immediately
suspect and subject to strict scrutiny). The United States Supreme Court has never declared that gender is a
suspect class, which would subject gender classifications to the strict scrutiny standard of review that race
classifications receive. ROSS, supra note 6, at 7. The California Supreme Court, however, has adopted the strict
scrutiny test when applying the state constitution's equal protection clause for laws discriminating against
women. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17, 22, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 543, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339, 343
(1971) (applying the strict scrutiny test to strike down California Business and Professions Code § 25656, which
prohibited the hiring of women as bartenders unless they or their husbands held the liquor license); see also CAI.
CONST. art. I §§ 11, 21 (providing the state equivalent to the federal equal protection law).
179. Powers, supra note 4, at 79; see OKIN, supra note 45, at 3 (noting that while the United States prides
itself on democratic values, such as equality of opportunity for all, equality has not been accofnplised); Taub
& Schneider, supra note 9, at 152-54 (finding that women are excluded from armed combat duty, cannot make
certain occupational choices, and are not in charge of their own reproduction choices).
180. OKIN, supra note 45, at 3; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and
Earnings (July 1987); Rum Smm., WOMEN AND CmLREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFuENT
AMERICA xvi, 158 (1986); DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT. POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 84, 84
(1988); see LENORE J. WErrZMAN, TiE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 339 (1985) [hereinafter DIVORCE REVOLuTON]
(reporting that one year after divorce, women's standard of living decreased by 73%, while men's had increased
by 42%). But see Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25
DE toGRAPHY 641 (1988) (finding only a 33% decline in living standards for women after divorce, even using
Weitzman's raw data).
181. OKIN, supra note 45, at 3.
182. See id. (finding that 2 out of 100 U.S. Senators are women, and the number of men chosen in each
congressional election far exceeds the number of women who have been elected during the entire history of the
United States).
183. William J. Eaton, Women in Congress Cite Gains on Family Issues, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at
A41. In 1993, Ruth Bader Ginsburg became the second woman on the United States Supreme Court, joining
Justice O'Connor. Sam Fulwood Ill, Ginsburg Confirmed as 2nd Woman on Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1993, at Al.
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rearing.' The subtle discrimination that occurs against women, and
holds them back from achieving true equality with men constantly arises.
A recent case before the Court of Appeal for the First District of
California, Borelli v. Brusseau,8 5 is such an example. The justices were
presented with the opportunity to overturn precedent that perpetuated
injustices against women, and yet a majority of the court failed to do so.
The question presented to the Borelli court involved the enforceability of
a contract among married parties for the performance of nursing care
services.1 6 Although this issue had already been decided by two courts
of appeal in Sonnicksen and Brooks, the appellate court had the
opportunity to decide the impact of Family Code section 850.'87
I. THE CASE
A. Factual and Procedural History
Hildegard and Michael Borelli entered into a prenuptial contract on
April 24, 1980, which presumably retained both partners' property as
separate property. 8' They married the next day and remained married
until Michael died in 1989.189 Michael was admitted to a hospital in
1983, 1984 and 1987 as a result of heart problems.' 90 Following the last
184. See OKIN, supra note 45, at 3-4 (submitting that husbands do not share in the family chores equally
with their wives); Janet Rosenberg et al., Now That We Are Here: Discrimination, Disparagement, and
Harassment at Work and the Experience of Women Lawyers, 7 GENDER & SOCtETY 415,428 (1993) (reporting
that almost one-half of the female attorneys in private sector workplaces describe inequalities in salary and
promotions); OKIN, supra note 45, at 144 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Earnings (July 1987); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No.
149, Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1984, at 2 (1985)) (finding
that full-time working women earn on average 71% of the earnings of full-time working men); id. at 145
(reporting that for the same job title, such as secretary, in 1985 male secretaries earned a median wage of $365
per week, while the median for female secretaries was $278).
185. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993) (rev. denied).
186. Id.
187. Id. The Borelli court, however, failed to calculate the effect of California Family Code section 850
in its decision. id.; see supra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (reporting the facts and holdings of
Sonnicksen and Brooks).
188. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 650, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. The content of the prenuptial agreement was
not given by the court of appeal. d; see id at 659 n.2, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 n.2 (Pochd, J., dissenting) (stating
that the trial court record does not include a copy of the prenuptial agreement, but the agreement seems to have
preserved Michael's substantial assets as separate property).
189. Id. at 650, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
190. Id The court noted that the hospitalizations occurred in March 1983, February 1984, and January
1987. Id.
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hospitalization, Michael had fears about his health and told Hildegard that
he intended to leave her a substantial amount of property.'9
While hospitalized, in August 1988, Michael suffered a stroke. t92
During his recovery in the hospital and at a subsequent rehabilitation
center, Michael repeatedly told his wife that he did not like the hospital,
and that he did not like being away from home.193 Michael also told his
wife that he did not want to be admitted to a nursing home, and reaffirmed
his desire to be back home, even though this would require twenty-four
hour a day care by Hildegard and modifications to the house.194 The
doctors recommended that Michael stay in either a rest home or a conva-
lescent hospital. 95
In October 1988, Michael and Hildegard entered into an oral
agreement.'9 Michael promised to change his current will to provide that
Hildegard receive a large portion of his separate property, including a lot
in Sacramento, California, a life estate for the use of a condominium in
Hawaii, a twenty-five percent interest in Borelli Meat Co., and all the cash
remaining in his bank accounts at the time of his death.9' In exchange
for Michael's promise to leave his separate property to her, Hildegard
promised to personally care for Michael at home for the duration of his
illness. 98 This agreement satisfied Michael's desire not to be admitted
into a nursing home.19
191. Id.
192. Id The court of appeal did not state why Michael was in the hospital this time. Id
193. Id
194. Id
195. Id at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
196. Id at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17; ef id at 659 n.2, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 n.2 (Poch6, J., dissenting)
(refuting the possibility of a statute of frauds defense to their oral agreement, since an affirmative defense is
detrimental reliance); infra notes 397-414 and accompanying text (arguing that the Borelli court could have
enforced the agreement between Michael and Hildegard on the basis of detrimental reliance or unjust
enrichment).
197. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 650, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. The property involved was: (I) a lot in
Sacramento, California; (2) a life estate for the use of a condominium in Hawaii; (3) a 25% interest in Borelli
Meat Co.; (4) all cash remaining in all existing bank accounts at the time of his death; (5) the costs of educating
Michael's step-daughter, Monique Lee; (6) Michael's entire interest in a residence in Kensington, California;
(7) all furniture located in the residence; (8) Michael's interest in a partnership; and (9) health insurance for
Hildegard and Monique Lee. Id. Hildegard's complaint alleges that Michael was to 'leave' the property to
Hildegard, which implies that they agreed to a will transfer. Id at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. Hildegard did not
allege that a transfer was to occur during Michael's lifetime. Ida See also Letter from Richard T. White, partner
at Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley, attorney for Hildegard Borelli, to Wendy Hillger, Comment Writer, Pacific
Law Journal (Jan. 19, 1994) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal) (noting that the property promised to
Hildegard was valued at approximately $500,000).
198. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
199. Id at 650, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
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Hildegard cared for Michael as promised, but Michael did not perform
his promise before he died in 1989.200 Instead of changing his will to
effectuate the promise, Michael left Hildegard $100,000 and his interest in
the residence they owned as joint tenants.0 1 The bulk of the estate
passed to Michael's daughter, Grace Brusseau, the defendant. 2
Hildegard sought specific performance of the promise by her deceased
husband to transmute his separate property to her.20 3 The Superior Court
of California in Contra Costa County denied Hildegard's claim to the
property by sustaining Grace Brusseau's demurrer to Hildegard's complaint
without leave to amend.2"4 In particular, the trial court held that the
agreement failed for lack of consideration and that to enforce the contract
would be against public policy.0"
The Court of Appeal for the First District of California reviewed the
case of Borelli v. Brusseau to decide whether an enforceable contract may
exist between a wife and husband for the performance of nursing care
duties.20 6 In Borelli, the court of appeal held that the contract violated
public policy and lacked consideration, thereby prohibiting Hildegard from
enforcing the agreement with her husband for his nursing care.20 7
B. The Majority Opinion
The Court of Appeal for the First District of California, in an opinion
written by Justice Perley, affirmed the decision of the trial court, which
200. Id. at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
201. Id. Since Hildegard and Michael were joint tenants in the residence they shared, Hildegard would
have received his one-half interest upon Michael's death regardless of the provision in Michael's will. Grothe
v. Cortlandt Corp., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1317, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 40 (4th Dist. 1992) (noting that nothing
passes from the deceased joint tenant to the survivor, but rather, the survivor takes from the instrument which
created the joint tenancy); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN 1112
UNr' D STATES § 6.1, at 7 (A. James Casner ed. 1952) (stating that the last survivor of a joint tenancy owns
the property in its entirety).
202. See Letter from Richard T. White, supra note 197 (estimating the total value of Michael's estate as
approximately $1,500,000).
203. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 649, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17; see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying
text (discussing the law of transmutations).
204. Borelli v. Brusseau, No. C91-03356 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. 1991).
205. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 649, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
206. Id. at 649, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
207. Id. at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20. But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (providing that
consideration is not a requirement for an intraspousal transmutation); infra notes 324-414 and accompanying text
(discussing the legal ramifications of the Borelli court ignoring California Family Code section 850). Review
of the Borelli case was denied by the California Supreme Court on April 1, 1993. Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal.
App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993), review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 1981, at *1 (Apr. 1, 1993).
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sustained the demurrer of Grace Brusseau.20 8  The court held that
Hildegard Borelli had not established a cause of action, since she has a
pre-existing statutory duty as a wife to provide nursing care services for
her husband.' In upholding the decision against Hildegard, the court
addressed the duties which stem from the marital relationship,210 and
examined whether nursing care services are to be characterized as being
part of the duty of support.211 Next, the court attempted to resolve
whether a marriage contract should be treated the same as other contractual
relationships.212 Due to the public interest in marriage, the Borelli court
found a contract for the provision of nursing care services is void as
against public policy, since a spouse is supposed to provide nursing care
services as part of the spousal statutory duties.21 3 The court then
confronted an issue raised by Hildegard's counsel, namely that the cases
relied upon by the majority lack precedential value today.1 Finally, the
court addressed the other arguments made by the dissent, namely that but
for the agreement between Michael and Hildegard to transmute property
in exchange for nursing care, Hildegard would have left Michael, and that
spouses should be treated as any other contracting parties.21 5 In holding
that Hildegard had not stated a cause of action, the court first examined the
duties that spouses owe each other as a result of the marriage contract.
208. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 649, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. Justice Perley was joined by Presiding Justice
Anderson. Id. at 655, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20. Justice Poch6 filed a dissenting opinion. Id. (Poch6, J., dissenting);
see infra notes 266-323 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Poch6's dissenting opinion).
209. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
210. Id. at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18; see infra notes 217-221 and accompanying text (delineating marital
duties).
211. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652-53, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18-19; see infra notes 222-226 and
accompanying text (holding that nursing care is a statutory duty).
212. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
213. Idl at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19; see infra notes 324-374 and accompanying text (arguing that not
enforcing contracts made between husband and wife as consenting adults results in the subordination of women).
214. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652-53, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19; see infra notes 227-239 and
accompanying text (examining the majority's discussion of Hildegard's arguments).
215. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20; see infra notes 253-265 and accompanying
text (noting the majority's discussion of the dissent's arguments). Though the contract between Hildegard and
Michael was not enforced, Hildegard did receive $100,000 from Michael's will, and his one-half interest in their
shared residence, which was owned by Michael and Hildegard as joint tenants. Id. at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
18. Grace Brusseau was the recipient of most of her father Michael's estate. Mike McKee, Wife Obligated To
Provide Nursing Care, Court Holds; Dissenter Blasts First District's Reasoning as Outdated, THE RECORDER,
Jan. 20, 1993, at 1.
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1. Nursing Care Services are Included in the Statutory Duty to
Support
The California Court of Appeal for the First District found that society
has concerns regarding marriage, and in accord with the need for the state
to protect and promote marriage, legislation has been enacted which
promulgates these societal concerns. 21 6 The Borelli court pointed out that
a contract is created by entrance into the marital state.217 By getting
married, it must be assumed that the parties entered the marriage with the
knowledge that they assume mutual legal and moral obligations of
support.2 I8 Justice Perley noted that the support obligations have been
defined broadly by courts, going so far as to hold that a spouse must give
the other sympathy, confidence, and fidelity, not simply cohabitation.219
The court also asserted that the support obligations include the provision
of protective supervision services for the other spouse, without receiving
compensation.22 Protective supervision services have been defined by
the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of California as the observation
and monitoring of a mentally impaired or mentally ill person, to ensure
that the recipient of the service does not get hurt.221
After recognizing that the duty of support includes providing protective
supervision, the court then addressed whether protective supervision
216. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18; see CAL FAM. CODE § 720 (West 1994)
(declaring that a husband and wife contract toward each other mutual obligations of respect, fidelity, and
support); id. § 721 (West 1994) (providing that a husband and wife can contract with each other regarding
property as if they were unmarried); id § 1620 (West 1994) (stating that a husband and wife cannot alter their
legal relations in a contract except as to property); id § 4300 (West 1994) (requiring that every individual shall
support his or her spouse); id. § 4301 (West 1994) (requiring a married person to support the other spouse while
they are living together); see also supra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional duties
of a wife, as declared by Sonnilcksen and Brooks).
217. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18; see Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts,
247 Cal. App. 2d 154, 165, 55 Cal. Rptr. 437, 444 (2d Dist. 1966) (stating that entrance into the marital state
creates a contract between husband and wife).
218. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18; Department of Mental Hygiene, 247 Cal.
App. 2d at 165, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (noting that upon entrance into marriage, it is assumed by the law, that the
parties know of the obligations that are required of each spouse towards the other); see also supra notes 87-129
and accompanying text (discussing the spousal duties stemming from the marriage contract, as enunciated by
Sonnicksen and Brooks).
219. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18; see In re Marriage of Rabie, 40 Cal. App.
3d 917, 922, 115 Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (2d Dist. 1974) (holding that a husband has the duty to offer sympathy,
confidence, and fidelity).
220. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18; see Miller v. Woods, 148 Cal. App. 3d
862, 877, 196 Cal. Rptr. 69, 79 (4th Dist. 1983) (stating that spouses must provide each other uncompensated
protective supervision services).
221. Miller, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 867 n.2, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 72 n.2.
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included nursing care services. 222 The court noted two cases, Estate of
Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen' and Brooks v. Brooks,2  which held that
a wife is obligated, by the marriage contract, to provide nursing-type care
to an ill husband, under California Civil Code sections 242, 4802, 5100,
5103, and 5132, and in accordance with public policy.'2 - The Borelli
court relied upon Sonnicksen and Brooks in holding that a wife has a duty
to provide nursing care services.226 The court then addressed two
arguments made by Hildegard's counsel regarding the inapplicability of
Sonnicksen and Brooks.'27 The first argument claimed that Sonnicksen
and Brooks lacked precedential value, since the cases are based upon
outdated views of women and marriage.228 Hildegard also claimed that
Sonnicksen and Brooks deny a woman equal protection of the laws, since
wives have to provide actual nursing services without receiving
compensation, while husbands only have a financial obligation of
support.229 The Court of Appeal for the First District of California
rejected both of these arguments by stating that the underlying rule and
reasoning of Sonnicksen and Brooks has been applied in modern cases to
both spouses2'2
The court of appeal found precedent holding that a wife has the right
to her husband's services, to rebut Hildegard's claim that only wives have
been held to have to provide services, in violation of her equal
222. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652-53, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18-19.
223. 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643 (1st Dist. 1937).
224. 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 119 P.2d 970 (2d Dist. 1941).
225. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18-19; Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347,
119 P.2d 970 (2d Dist. 1941); Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643 (Ist Dist.
1937). California Civil Code sections 242, 4802, 5100, 5103, and 5132 have been recodified in the California
Family Code at sections 720, 721, 1620, 4300, and 4301. See supra note 216 (delineating these California
Family Code provisions); supra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Sonnicksen and Brooks
cases). But see Ayoob v. Ayoob, 74 Cal. App. 2d 236, 248, 168 P.2d 462, 470 (3d Dist. 1946) (holding
Sonnicksen and Brooks inapplicable to a prenuptial agreement, since the Sonnicksen agreement was formulated
before the parties contemplated marriage, and the parties in Brooks considered their marriage only incidental to
the provision of necessary nursing care services).
226. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652-53, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18-19.
227. 1&. at 652-53, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
228. See id. at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (setting forth the arguments of Hildegard Borelli); supra notes
87-129 and accompanying text (analyzing the Sonnicksen and Brooks decisions).
229. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652-53, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
230. Id. at 653, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (citing Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 67, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025,
137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1977); Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 404-405, 525 P.2d 669,
683-84, 115 Cal. Rptr 765, 779-80 (1974); In re Marriage of Rabie, 40 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 115 Cal. Rptr.
594, 597 (2d Dist. 1974)).
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protection.2 1 Thus, the court found that a wife is entitled to
compensation when she is deprived of her husband's physical assistance
in operating the family home. 2 In further support of its assertion that
Sonnicksen and Brooks are still valid, the Borelli court discussed precedent
which allowed a husband to recover consortium damages in the wrongful
death action of his wife, since she had taken care of him with his
emphysema condition. 23 Since a husband was allowed to recover for the
loss of his wife's services when she died, Justice Perley considered the
precedent illustrative of the idea that Sonnicksen and Brooks did not
violate Hildegard's right to equal protection.3 The Borelli court also
discovered recent case law that spoke approvingly of Sonnicksen and
Brooks.235 The majority, therefore, noted that the recent approval of
Sonnicksen and Brooks reaffirmed their precedential value.236 The
precedent relied upon, according to the Borelli court, demonstrates that
marital support means more than physical care that could be provided by
hired help. 7 The court found that support means sympathy, comfort,
love, companionship, and affection. 8 Thus, the court of appeal
concluded that the duty of support is personally owed by the spouse, and
231. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 653, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19; see Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d
at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (holding that a wife can recover consortium damages for loss of a husband's
physical assistance in maintenance of the family home). Consortium was defined by the Borelli court as the legal
right of a spouse to the other spouse's service, companionship, and love. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 653, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 240 (1981)).
232. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 653, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19; see Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 409 n.31, 525
P.2d at 687 n.31, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 783 n.31 (1974) (finding that a married woman can claim loss of consortium
for the deprivation of her husband's personal assistance around the house).
233. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 653, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19; see Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 70, 562 P.2d at
1027, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (defining consortium).
234. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 653, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (arguing that the rule and policy of
Sonnicksen and Brooks has recently been applied to both men and women, so the rule of Sonnicksen and Brooks
is still valid as precedent); see also Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 70, 562 P.2d at 1027, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (stating
that a husband can recover for lost consortium when he is deprived of his deceased wife's nursing care services).
235. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 653, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
236. Id; see Watkins v. Watkins, 143 Cal. App. 3d 651,654-55, 192 Cal. Rptr. 54,55-56 (3d Dist. 1983)
(approving the rule propounded by Sonnicksen and Brooks, but not extending the rle to cover the period before
marriage). Watkins held that a woman could recover for the homemaking services that she provided prior to the
marriage. Id.
237. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
238. Id.; see Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 67, 562 P.2d at 1025, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 866 (finding support to include
comfort); Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d at 404, 535 P.2d 669, 683-84, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765,
779-80 (1974) (stating that marital support also includes love, companionship, and affection); In re Marriage of
Rabie, 40 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 115 Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (2d Dist. 1974) (holding sympathy to be part of the
support that spouses owe each other).
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cannot be delegated to a third party.29 The Borelli court reached this
conclusion by finding that the personal duty implicit in the definition of
marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract.24 The
court, therefore, adhered to the longstanding rule that a spouse is not
entitled to compensation for support.241 In addition, the court affirmed
the rule that performance of a personal duty created by the marriage
contract does not constitute new consideration for the agreement at
issue.242 Given that nursing care is within a spouse's duty of support, the
court turned to the issue of whether Hildegard and Michael's contract was
enforceable.
2. A Marital Contract for Nursing Care Services is Void as a
Violation of Public Policy and Under the Pre-existing Duty
Rule
The Borelli court stated that due to the public interest in marriage, the
marriage contract is fundamentally different from other contractual rela-
tions.243 Though not discussed by the court, other California decisions
have held that the public interest in marriage is to preserve the marriage
relationship because it is essential to the maintenance of organized
society.244 The Borelli court then stated that to effectuate the public
239. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (noting that marital duties are owed by
husband and wife personally, since other statutory duties such as fidelity and mutual respect cannot be
delegated); infra notes 301-323 and accompanying text (describing Justice Poch6's dissent in Borelli and his
rejection of the requirement that a spouse must personally perform the nursing care).
240. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West
1983) (reenacted by CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 1994)) (providing that marriage is a personal relation arising
out of a civil contract between a man and a woman).
241. Id. The court noted that a spouse does have rights to the community property of the couple, since
community property is a result of both spouses' labor. Id.
242. Id.; see Estate of Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d475, 479, 73 P.2d 643, 645 (1st Dist.
1937) (holding that a wife is to provide nursing care services to her spouse as part of the marriage contract).
But see infra notes 375-396 and accompanying text (arguing that consideration is not required for intraspousal
property transmutation agreements, as governed by California Family Code section 850).
243. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (quoting from Hendricks v. Hendricks, 125
Cal. App. 2d 239, 242, 270 P.2d 80, 82 (1st Dist. 1954)).
244. See Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 275, 758 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259 (1988)
(asserting that the public policy in favor of marriage stems from the necessity in an organized society of
providing an institutional basis for defining people's fundamental responsibilities and rights); De Burgh v. De
Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 870, 250 P.2d 598, 604 (1952) (stating that the public has an interest in the children of
the marriage, as well as encouraging the prospect of reconciliation among spouses); Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82,
86, 142 P.2d 417, 419 (1943) (stating that the law will not enforce agreements between spouses that encourage
dissolution of the marriage because preservation of established marriages are necessary for society). The public
interest requires the court to foster and protect marriage, to encourage parties to live together, and to prevent
separation. Id.; Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476,482,74 P. 28, 30 (1903) (declaring that probably every
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interest in marriage, the State must regulate the formation and dissolution
of marriage."5 Regulation of the marital relationship, as the court noted,
is solely within the province of the legislature, except as restricted by the
Constitution.246 The laws relating to marriage and divorce, the court
continued, were enacted because of the public concern for the dignity and
stability of the marriage relationship.247 The agreement between Michael
and Hildegard did not deserve to be enforced, the Borelli court decided,
on two separate grounds-a public policy argument, and the pre-existing
duty rule.248 The court first concluded, without any more explanation,
that since a spouse is required to provide nursing care, a contract where a
spouse receives compensation for nursing care services is void as against
public policy.249
The court then employed the pre-existing duty rule, to hold that
because Hildegard already had to provide nursing care as part of her
marital duties, there was no consideration for her husband's promise to
exchange his separate property for the nursing care.' 0 The court held
state in the country has enacted statutes regarding marriage which seek to foster marriage, to discourage the
parties from separating, and to prevent illicit unions).
245. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (quoting Haas v. Haas, 227 Cal. App. 2d 615,
617, 38 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812-13 (2d Dist. 1964)).
246. Id The Haas court does not specify whether regulation of marriage is restricted by the federal
Constitution or the California Constitution. Haas, at 617, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 812. But see Henry H. Foster, Jr.,
Marriage: A "Basic Civil Right Of Man," 37 FORDHAM L. Ray. 51, 51 (1968) (arguing that the United States
Supreme Court, with the decisions of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), has cast doubt as to the State's complete control over marriage, which may now be subject to
federal evaluation, due to the constitutional rights of individual liberty and privacy).
247. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 55-181) (reenacted
by CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7000-7002, 7050-7052, 7110-7111, 7120-7123, 7130-7137, 7140-7143 (Vest 1994)).
But see id. at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24 (Pochd, J., dissenting) (showing that if a spouse has left, and the other
promised something to get the absent spouse to return, California courts have enforced such agreements as
supported by consideration); e.g., Bowden v. Bowden, 175 Cal. 711, 714-15, 167 P. 154, 155 (1917) (noting
that the law favors reconciliation between husband and wife, and reconciliation contracts are commendable);
Braden v. Braden, 178 Cal. App. 2d 481, 483, 3 Cal. Rptr. 120, 122 (4th Dist. 1960) (upholding an agreement
between husband and wife which was that if they could not work out their differences, the wife would return
the money he had put into the house owned by her).
248. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19; see supra notes 100-106 and accompanying
text (discussing the public policy rule, stating that a contract against public policy is not enforceable); supra
notes 77-81 and accompanying text (explaining the pre-existing duty rule, which provides that there will be no
consideration for an agreement if the promisee agrees to do some duty which she already must perform).
249. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (holding that agreements anong spouses
for the provision of nursing care services violate public policy, and are thus void); supra notes 243-244 and
accompanying text (discussing the public policy rationale of the California courts, as expressed in Hill v. Hill,
23 Cal. 2d 82, 86, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (1943)). The Hill court stated that public policy requires courts to foster
and protect marriage, to encourage parties to live together, and to prevent separation. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d at 86, 142
P.2d at 422.
250. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
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that the nursing care agreement was void without consideration." Justice
Perley, however, apparently ignored an arguably relevant legislative
provision, Family Code section 850, which allows a husband and wife to
transmute property by agreement, without meeting the typical contract
requirement of consideration.2 2 In support of its decision, the Borelli
court rebutted the argument made by the dissent that the cases followed by
the majority are no longer good law.
3. The Dissent's Claim that the Precedent is Outdated is Not
Persuasive
The Borelli court then went on to answer three issues raised by the
dissent.2 3 The dissent first claimed that no rule of law becomes
untouchable as a result of the duration of its existence. 4 The majority
agreed with the dissent's proposition, but the court stated that there are no
valid reasons to overturn the well-established rule of not allowing
compensation for the provision of nursing care to one's spouse.255
Instead, the court of appeal noted that even if the rule, in its origins, was
used to deny compensation for women only, this fact is not a consideration
in Borelli, since the rule is applied in a gender-neutral way today.256 In
support of the rule, the majority stated that the rule protects against
fraud. 57 Creditor fraud can occur when a debtor spouse transfers
property to the non-debtor spouse *solely to remove the property from the
creditor's reach, but is done under the guise of payment for domestic
services.25 8 The court acknowledged that this possibility of fraud is not
251. See id. (stating directly that there was no consideration, and that consideration is needed for an
interspousal property transmutation). But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (allowing these transmutations
without fulfilling the traditional consideration requirement); supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text
(discussing consideration and the pre-existing duty rule); infra notes 375-396 and accompanying text (asserting
that consideration is not a requirement for a transmutation, as set forth by California Family Code § 850).
252. See CAL FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (providing that spouses may agree to transmute property
without consideration); infra notes 375-396 and accompanying text (discussing the legal ramifications of the
Borelli court overlooking California Family Code § 850).
253. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20; see infra notes 266-323 and accompanying
text (discussing the dissenting opinion of Justice Poceh6).
254. IdM; see id at 659, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23, 25-26 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (quoting JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HoLMEs, COLLEcTED LErAL PAPERS 187 (1920), stating that it is not proper for the sole rationale
of a law to be that is was formulated in the time of Henry IV); infra notes 266-323 and accompanying text
(discussing the opinion of the dissent).
255. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
256. 1a.
257. Id
258. Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883).
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enough to justify the rule, but claimed that the rule is still viable, since not
all rationales for the rule are outdated.25 9
In dissent, Justice Poch6 argued that refusing to enforce such spousal
agreements will lead to marriage dissolution, and that, but for the
agreement, Hildegard would have left her husband Michael.260 In
response, the majority stated that the real issue was whether negotiations
at the bedside of an ill spouse are contrary to the institution of marriage,
and found that enforcement of such agreements indeed would be
antithetical to preserving a marriage.2 61 The majority also stated that it
did not believe marriage would be encouraged by a rule that enforced
bargaining made at the sickbed.262
The majority responded to Justice Poch6's final argument that social
mores have changed such that spouses can be treated the same as any
other parties who are negotiating at arm's length.263 The majority did not
agree that spouses should be treated the same as any other party to a
contract, because marriage is still defined by the legislature as a personal
relationship of mutual support.264 Thus, the court held that a nursing care
agreement between spouses will not be enforced.
26
C. The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Pochd
Justice Poch6 wrote separately because he disagreed with the majority's
view that a wife has a pre-existing duty to personally provide nursing
care.266 Justice Poch6's dissent can be separated into two assertions
259. Id.
260. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24 (Pochd, J., dissenting) (noting that no
legal force could compel Hildegard not to leave Michael after he became ill); idU at 661 n.3, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 24 n.3 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (finding the implication that Hildegard would have left Michael if there was no
agreement, from her complaint, which states that she gave up the opportunity to live an independent life as
consideration for the agreement); infra notes 313-323 and accompanying text (reporting the dissent's argument
that not enforcing agreements such as the Borelli's may foster not reconciliation, as the majority hopes, but
rather dissolution).
261. Ia at 654-55, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
262. Rd.
263. Id; see id at 657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (discussing the changing economic
realities of today's society, in that a wife may make significant financial contributions by having employment
outside the home).
264. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20. To substantiate the statement that spouses
should be treated differently from other parties to a contract, the court asserted that marital support is one of the
few situations left that cannot command a price. Id.
265. Id
266. Id at 655, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see supra notes 216-226 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's martial duty analysis in Borelli).
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supporting the notion that the traditional rule, reaffirmed by the majority
in Borelli, should be reconsidered.2 67 In particular, Justice Pochd argued
that the attitudes regarding marriage, as relied upon in the traditional rule
of Sonnicksen and Brooks, are outdated.268 Second, Justice Poch6
dissented because there is no requirement that nursing care for one who is
ill must be personally provided by a spouse.2 69
1. The Traditional Rule of Sonnicksen and Brooks Ignores the
Legal and Economic. Realities of the 1990's
Justice Poch6 began his opinion by stating that while the majority read
and applied the cases of Sonnicksen and Brooks correctly, the reasoning
behind those decisions is outdated and, therefore, should be
abandoned.7 Justice Poch6 acknowledged that the rule of Sonnicksen
and Brooks, denying a spouse compensation for nursing care services, is
followed nationwide.271 The dissent claimed that precedent illustrates the
mores of society that existed when the Sonnicksen and Brooks cases were
decided, including the idea that a husband is authorized to receive his
wife's services.272 The dissent sought to demonstrate, by implication, that
society has changed dramatically from the time the decisions came down,
and thus their legal basis has eroded. 7 3 Therefore, Justice Poch6 con-
cluded that the cases relied upon by the majority should be overturned.274
The obsolete beliefs include the notions that contracts for domestic ser-
vices will make the woman a servant in her home where she should hap-
pily perform the domestic duties, and that spouses should perform nursing
267. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 655, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
logic behind the Sonnicksen and Brooks cases is ripe for reexamination).
268. L at 655, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20-21 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see infra notes 270-286 and
accompanying text (discussing the dissent's view that the social mores of the time when Sonnicksen and Brooks
came down have changed and that our society has left behind traditional gender roles).
269. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see infra notes 301-
323 and accompanying text (stating the position of Justice Poch6 that since a spouse does not have to personally
provide the nursing care, a contract for such services should be enforced).
270. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 655, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20-21 (Pocb6, J., dissenting).
271. Ia4 at 655-56 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see id. (citing Bohanan v. Maxwell, 181
N.W. 683 (Iowa 1921); Foxworthy v. Adams, 124 S.W. 381 (Ky. 1910); Martinez v. Martinez, 307 P.2d 1117
(N.M. 1957); Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. 1945); Oates v. Oates, 33 S.E.2d 457 (W.Va. 1945)).
272. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 656, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 659, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
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care services automatically due to the love and affection between husband
and wife.275
Justice Poch6 rejected cases like Sonnicksen and Brooks, because
statements by these courts, that a husband is entitled to his wife's services,
seem like an application of the common law doctrine of coverture 6 The
dissent noted that coverture was rejected by the United States Supreme
Court in 1960 because the doctrine was founded upon archaic medieval
views that are offensive to today's society." Justice Poch6 concluded,
therefore, that the Sonnicksen and Brooks rule likewise should be
abandoned. 28
Justice Poch6 further argued that current economic realities also impact
the case law cited by the Borelli majority. 279 First, Justice Poch6 stated
that the assumption that few wives can contribute financially to the family
is outdated. 80 In particular, Justice Poch6 noted that many married
women today make significant economic contributions to the marriage by
being employed outside the home.28' Second, husbands today take part
in the household chores.28 2 Last, the option of divorce is frequently used
275. Id. at 656, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Pochd, J., dissenting); Foxworthy v. Adams, 124 S.W. 381, 383
(Ky. 1910); see Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883) (noting that to allow wives to contract with their spouse
for domestic services degrades the wives like servants); supra notes 107-129 and accompanying text (discussing
the Brooks court rationale, which held that enforcement of contracts for the payment of domestic services would
breed discord, degrade the wife into a common servant, and possibly allow the spouses to defraud their
creditors).
276. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 656, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see I BLACKSTONE,
supra note 131, at 442 (stating that during marriage at common law in England, the husband and wife merged
into a single legal entity); MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 1 (describing that under coverture a married
woman could not own property free from her husband's claim or control, or make a contract); see also United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 359 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that in reality the single legal entity
is the husband).
277. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21-22 (Poch6, J., dissenting). (discussing United
States V. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 52-53 (1960)). Justice Poch6 noted that in coverture it was assumed that a wife
could not contribute to the family economically. Id. There also was an implicit agreement for the husband to
support the family financially, which entitled him to his wife's domestic services. Idl Coverture has also been
rejected in California. See id. at 657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (citing California Civil Code
§§ 242, 5100, 5132, which states that there are mutual duties of support between a husband and wife). But see
MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 64, 75 (arguing that many other disabilities are still imposed upon the
marriedwoman, such as the obligation of a wife to provide domestic services, which deprives her of the legal
right to her own labor, ignores her contribution to the family's prosperity, and leads to vulnerability in old age,
upon divorce, and in disability).
278. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
279. Id at 657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
280. Id The dissent, however, did not cite any statistics to support this proposition. Id.
281. See id (Poch, J., dissenting) (asserting that the number of two income families is no longer
significant).
282. Id No support was given for this proposition by the dissenting justice. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at
657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
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to escape an unhappy situation.283 Justice Poch6 therefore concluded that,
as a society, we have left behind traditional gender roles.29" Justice
Poch6 noted that women are not necessarily relegated solely to the kitchen
and expected to do all the domestic chores.28 5 Thus, in Justice Pochd's
opinion the provision of extensive nursing care, as in Michael Borelli's
case, is not within the duties owed by a wife to her husband, and can be
the subject of a marital agreement.286
Justice Poch6 also established that the law is no longer blind as to what
goes on within the marriage, even if public policy protects the institution
of marriage.8 7 Justice Poch6 reasoned that the previous noninterference
by the law into marital relations was to protect domestic harmony.2 8 The
argument for noninterference, as noted by Justice Poch6, has been rejected
in part to allow interspousal litigation.289 Since spouses can now sue each
other, Justice Poch6 stated that it is not a stretch to allow a wife to sue on
a contract for the performance of nursing care services.2 9 Also, Justice
Poch6 pointed out that in cases where one spouse has died, as was the case
in Borelli, it is absurd to speak of not enforcing the agreement between the
spouse and the deceased spouse's estate due to a concern for preserving
domestic harmony.29 Since Michael is deceased, there is no marriage
relationship to preserve. 92
283. Id
284. Id.
285. Id.; see supra notes 137-149 and accompanying text (discussing the public/private dichotomy, which
argues that women are subordinated to the private sphere, consisting of the home and childrearing); supra notes
169-186 and accompanying text (submitting that women are still discriminated against due to their gender).
286. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 657, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (noting that where
marital duties and rights regarding property are not governed by positive law, they may be altered by formal
agreement or informal accommodations, as allowed by California Civil Code §§ 5200, 5310-5312).
287. I. at 657-58, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 880,
395 P.2d 893, 894, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 846 (1964) (expressing the proposition that the law no longer ignores
crimes committed by one spouse against the other); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West Supp. 1994)
(providing criminal sanctions for rape of one's spouse).
288. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see supra notes 137-
149 and accompanying text (discussing the public/private sphere distinction).
289. See Bore/li, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (discussing the
removal of barriers to interspousal litigation for criminal acts, tortious conduct, and breach of contract); cf.
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 915-16, 479 P.2d 648, 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 288 (1971) (concluding that
the immunity granted to parents from suits by their children, since abolished, is comparable to the intraspousal
immunity, which also has been significantly cut back).
290. Borelif, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22-23 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
292. See id. (stating that preservation of the marriage is merely an academic concern in cases such as
Boreli).
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The dissent recognized that a concern about fraud in regard to creditors
was another reason for the Brooks-Sonnicksen rule against enforcement of
nursing care agreements in exchange for property between husband and
wife.293 Justice Poch6, however, stated that the California Supreme Court
has renounced the idea that an entire category of litigation between
husband and wife could be barred due to the possibility of fraud. 214
Today, as noted by Justice Poch6, litigation between husband and wife is
allowed, and the fact finders are to decide whether fraud was com-
mitted.295 Since the decisions giving the issue of fraud to the fact finder
came down after Brooks and Sonnicksen were decided, Justice Poch6
argued that the new cases provide one more reason to reconsider and reject
the traditional rule that does not allow agreements between spouses
regarding nursing care services. 296 Besides claiming that the traditional
rule forbidding spouses from making contracts that contemplate the
exchange of services for property is no longer persuasive, the dissent also
established that the rule is contrary to legislative enactments.
Justice Poch6 pointed out that California Civil Code sections 4802 and
5103 permit spouses to enter into any transaction regarding property with
each other as if they were unmarried.297 The dissent argued that these
statutes and the idea of freedom of contract should enable agreements such
293. Id at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Poch, J., dissenting); see supra note 258 and accompanying text
(setting forth the manner in which fraud could be perpetrated by a husband and wife).
294. Id (Pochd, J., dissenting); see Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 431-32, 289 P.2d 218, 225 (1955)
(stating that courts will not immunize tortfeasors from liability in a whole class of cases because of the
possibility of fraud).
295. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Pochd, J., dissenting). Before fraud was
decided at trial, the demurrer was used to decide whether a contract was induced by fraud. Id.
296. See id (quoting JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, CoLLECaD LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920)) (finding
it revolting for a law to persist simply because it was enforced that way in the past, when the reasons for the
law have since vanished).
297. See id (noting that the California Legislature passed California Civil Code §§ 4802 and 5103, without
fear that it would make a spouse a hired servant by enforcing an agreement between the spouses to exchange
nursing services for property); CAL FAM. CODE § 721 (West 1994) (reenacting CAL CIV. CODE § 5103)
(permitting spouses to contract with each other as if they were not married); id § 1620 (West 1994) (reenacting
CAL. CiV. CODE § 4802) (providing the ability of husband and wife to contract with each other regarding
property); see also ia § 850 (West 1994) (allowing husband and wife to transmute the character of their property
from one's separate property to the other spouse's separate property, or transmute separate property to
community property, and vice versa); Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (2d Dist.
1941) (stating that enforcement of domestic service agreements degrades a wife by making her a paid servant,
when she should do such chores out of love); supra notes 107-129 and accompanying text (discussing the
Brooks holding); supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (defining transmutations and the statutory
requirements for a valid transmutation).
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as the one at issue in Borelli to be enforced.298 The existence of a
marriage certificate should not deprive spouses of the freedom of contract
that they would enjoy if not married, according to Justice Poch&299 Since
Michael and Hildegard could validly contract for nursing care in exchange
for property if they were not married, Justice Poch6 opined that their
freedom to contract is denied by the majority's approach.30 0 In addition
to denying married parties the same freedom of contract as unmarried
people, the dissent also found fault with the majority's holding that a
spouse must provide nursing care to an ill spouse personally.
2. There is No Requirement that Nursing Care Must Be Personally
Provided by the Spouse
Justice Poch6, in dissent, recognized that a duty of support is owed
between husband and wife and that the provision of medical care is part
of this duty.3"' Justice Poche, however, did not find that the cases cited
by the majority require that the obligation be personally provided by the
spouse.3 °2 The dissent noted that when Sonnicksen and Brooks were
decided, it was logical for those courts to say that a wife could only
perform her spousal duty by caring for her ill husband personally.0 3 A
holding which stated that a wife could only fulfill her duty by personally
providing nursing care stems from the fact that before World War II,
women in general did not work much outside the home, so there was no
other way to take care of their sick husbands but to do so personally.3t 4
Since women were expected to be at home and to care for their sick
spouses, a wife was giving up nothing of value by agreeing to perform the
nursing care duty.30 5
298. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Poch6, J., dissenting); see Perkins v. Sunset
Tel. and Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 720, 103 P. 190, 194 (1909) (stating that California Civil Code § 5103,
providing that spouses may enter into contracts with each other as if they were unmarried, is an example of the
state giving the utmost freedom of contract to spouses).
299. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 659, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
300. See id at 659, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (noting that Michael and Hildegard, if
strangers, could validly contract with each other for the provision of nursing care services).
301. Ia (quoting Hawkins v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 413,418-19, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491,495 (4th
Dist. 1979)).
302. I
303. Ia
304. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 659-60, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23-24 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
305. Ia
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The dissent argued that today, however, women should not be expected
to personally discharge their spousal duty for nursing care.30 6 The world
has changed dramatically since Sonnicksen was decided, due to the
transformation of society that occurred with the onset of World War
II.307 To illustrate the societal changes, Justice Poch6 pointed out that
hundreds of thousands of women left home and went to work in jobs
vacated by male workers initially to help with the war effort." 8 Women
have continued to work since then, in growing numbers.3M Since many
women today work outside the home, in Justice Poch6's opinion, there
should be alternatives to personally providing nursing care Options
should be available because if a non-working spouse takes ill, the Borelli
rule would mandate that the working spouse quit work and stay home
twenty-four hours a day.31' As alternatives to quitting one's job to care
for the spouse personally, Justice Poch6 listed paying for professional help,
paying for non-professional assistance, and getting help from friends and
relatives.312
The dissent characterized the majority's rule as limiting the contracting
power of married people.313 Justice Poch6 stated that it is improper to
limit spouses' contracting power, since spouses then have less power than
non-married people, which is not justified by legitimate public policy.31 4
The public policy that the majority claims it is upholding, posits Justice
Poch6, is to foster marriage.3 5 The dissent asserted that the effect of the
traditional rule as affirmed by the majority may be to actually force
separations.316 In fact, California courts have found consideration and,
therefore, have enforced agreements where one spouse has left the
relationship and the other spouse has promised property on the condition
that the absent spouse returns. 317 Michael and Hildegard reached largely
the same result, the dissent contends, without obtaining a legal separation,
306. Id
307. 1L at 660, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
308. Ad
309. See OKN, supra note 45, at 142 (noting that women's participation in the labor force has risen, from
35% in 1960, to 57% in 1986).
310. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 660, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
311. 1d Justice Poch6 noted that if Hillary Clinton got sick, President Clinton would have to drop
everything and personally care for Hillary. AL
312. Id
313. Ad at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25 (Pochd, J., dissenting).
314. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
315. AL at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
316. AL
317. 1&
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if Hildegard's complaint is read to imply that, but for the agreement, she
would have left Michael."' Justice Poch6 argues that there is no sound
reason why the Borelli's contract should not be as valid as a reconciliation
contract, since both types of contracts facilitate continuation of the
marriage relationship." 9 The justification given by the majority in favor
of its decision to invalidate the Borelli agreement is that to allow spouses
to contract for domestic services is disruptive to the marital
relationship.3 2 The dissent, however, felt that the possibility of
disharmony between husband and wife is not enough of a threat to deny
a spouse the ability to receive compensation provided in a contract.32" '
The idea behind the majority rule is the notion that one spouse should care
for the other through sickness and in health, but the rationale was not
persuasive to Justice Poch6.32 The sentiment of spousal love, in the
dissent's view, is not a substitute for modem day reality, and Justice Poch6
believes it improper to deny married people the same contracting power
that non-married people have to order their affairs.323
II. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The decision in Borelli v. Brusseau324 reaffirmed the traditional law
relating to a wife's statutory duties toward her husband.3 2 The Borelli
decision thus fails to foster true equality among the sexes, since refusing
to enforce spousal contracts does not treat women as equal to men. When
the law mandates that wives must personally provide nursing care services
to their husbands, the law acts to relegate women to the private
sphere.326 The relegation results in unequal treatment for women, because
by fulfilling their gender role as homemakers, women are given little
318. Id.
319. Id. at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25 (Poch6, J., dissenting). Justice Poch6 states that intraspousal
litigation may be unseemly, but is not a novelty anymore. Id
321. Id
322. Id.
323. la at 661, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
324. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993).
325. Id. at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (stating that nursing care is a spouse's statutory duty); see also
supra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional law relating to nursing care duty, as seen
in Sonnicksen and Brooks).
326. See Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (holding that a wife is obligated by the
marriage contract to personally provide nursing care to her husband).
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opportunity to obtain power, prestige, or paid work. 27 Men, on the other
hand, are free to enter the working world to gain money and power,
without feeling the subtle, but entrenched, gender restraints that force
women to do the childrearing and housework.328
As a result of the distribution of labor within the family by gender,
women become financially dependent upon their husbands.129 The
inability to leave home due to responsibilities there, and the inability to
earn money for providing domestic services, which is the sole occupation
of many wives, creates a dependence of women upon their husbands.330
This financial dependence is compounded by the fact that if women do get
jobs outside the home, they are not paid the same as men.3"' Having
little independent income may not be a problem for women if the marriage
remains intact, since the husband will financially support his wife;
however, women become vulnerable to poverty upon the death of their
husbands or upon divorce.332 Lifetime housewives also experience regret
about relinquished career opportunities.33
Besides keeping women tucked away in the private sphere, the Borelli
holding also gives women less contracting power than men. In addition,
the Borelli case may be incorrectly decided from the standpoint of
California statutory law. The decision arguably goes against the express
language of Family Code section 850 which states that consideration is not
327. See MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 73 (arguing that the only way most people can acquire
income and property is through their own labor); OKIN, supra note 45, at 142-44 (fulfilling their gender role as
the homemaker forces women to sacrifice career opportunities, which leads to women's limited access to work,
power, prestige, self-esteem, and security).
328. See OKIN, supra note 45, at 149 (finding that women do far more housework and childcare then men
do, in almost all families).
329. Id. at 151-52.
330. See MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 73 (noting that when the law treats a woman's labor
as her 'wifely duty' and denies her compensation for it, she is deprived of her major, and often only, means of
financial gain).
331. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (delineating the disparity in men's and women's wages).
332. See OKIN, supra note 45, at 4 (finding women vulnerable and dependent upon their husbands, since
they do not develop the skills necessary for re-entry into the job market if there is a divorce or death of the
husband); MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 58 (arguing that women are given a false sense of security
when they rely upon the husband's promise to support the couple, since there may not be enough financial
support during the marriage or upon dissolution).
333. MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 58; see Christine E. Grella, Irreconcilable Differences:
Women Defining Class After Divorce and Downward Mobility, 4 GENDER & SOC'y 43 (1990) (reporting that
divorce shakes women loose from their identity with a certain social class and the core of their self-esteem,
which had before been exclusively determined by their husband's education, occupation and income). Professor
Grella notes that divorced women, when asked to evaluate their own social status, i.e., upper, middle, or lower
class, routinely measured their status in terms of their ex-husband or father, thus denying that they actually had
any status of their own. Id. at 42 (citing Ruth A. Brandwein et. al., Women and Children Last: The Social
Situation of Divorced Mothers and Their Families, 36 . MARRIAGE & FAM. 498, 500 (1974)).
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a requirement for a transmutation of property among spouses. 4 Lastly,
there existed alternate methods which would have allowed the Borelli court
to enforce the Borelli's agreement, even in the absence of
consideration.335
A. Courts Must Stop Relegating Women to The Private Sphere of
Home and Family
The stance of the Borelli court-mandating that a woman personally
provide services for her husband-perpetuates the traditional model of the
family, which has a male head of the household as its sole breadwinner,
with the woman staying home in the private sphere to cook, clean, and
care for the children. 36 The traditional model of the family continues to
be a strong influence on what men and women think and how they
behave.337 Accordingly, women place the commitment to family first,
while men are to provide financial support.338
When courts do not regulate private agreements between husband and
wife, existing power relationships stay intact.339 Men benefit by the
maintenance of the status quo, since men have more power than women
in the typical relationship.2 Male domination within the marriage is
strongly reinforced by the belief in the role of the male as provider.34'
334. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (rejecting the requirement of consideration for property
transmutations among spouses during marriage, in favor of allowing the agreement to be enforced with or
without consideration); see also supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of
California Family Code § 850 (West 1994)); infra notes 375-396 and accompanying text (urging the legislature
to clarify California Family Code § 850 and overrule Borelli, since the court misapplied the consideration
requirement).
335. See infra notes 398-401, 403-407 and accompanying text (setting forth the doctrines of detrimental
reliance and unjust enrichment).
336. See OKIN, supra note 45, at 141 (noting that marital responsibility within the marriage is traditionally
sex-differentiated, with women having the role of the primary parent and homemaker, while men are placed in
the role of primary breadwinner); Powers, supra note 4, at 72 (expressing the assumption that since women give
birth, it is necessary for them to be the primary raisers of children).
337. OKIN, supra note 45, at 141.
338. See Ud at 142 (finding young women are more likely than young men to regard having a good
marriage and family life as extremely important). Valuing family is due to socialization and culture. Id.
339. See Powers, supra note 4, at 73 (stating that the law does not regulate most aspects of the private
sphere, since to regulate it would blur the demarcation between the two spheres).
340. OKIN, supra note 45, at 141.
341. Id.; see MARRIAGE CONTRAcT, supra note 10, at 5 (finding that the husband is the head of the family,
as shown by the fact that his wife and kids assume his name, and his social and economic status). Placement
of the obligation of primary support on the husband reinforces his place at the head of the household with legal
power over family finances. Id. at 26. See also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1100, 1102 (West 1994) (placing the right
to management and control of community property with the spouses equally). This is a change from pre-1973
law, which allowed only the husband to manage and control the couple's community property estate. CAL CIV.
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Since a husband's work is paid, and our society values economic success,
the husband receives status, prestige, and power within the marriageY 2
Since a wife's traditional work at home in the private sphere is not paid,
however, she has little power and prestige 3 In keeping with their ideas
of the importance of family, women make occupational choices that facili-
tate the demands of being a primary parent, such as flexible hours.'3
The jobs women choose in order to care for their families, however, are
low-paying, involve poor working conditions, and possess little possibility
for upward mobility.'
The absence of law in the private sphere allows men to control the
marriage relationship and leaves power in the male/female relationship to
the party who is economically, politically, and physically stronger, usually
the male 6 It is thus not uncommon for a husband to use his status as
the primary bread-winner to enforce his wishes regarding household issues,
such as who is to do the bulk of the housework.34'7 The single-income
male dominated household, relied upon by the Estate of Sonnicksen v.
Sonnicksen,348 Brooks v. Brooks,349 and Borelli v. Brusseau35S  courts
CODE § 5125 Historical Note (West 1983).
342. OKIN, supra note 45, at 141; see MARRIAGE COmTRACr, supra note 10, at 26 (noting that placement
of the primary obligation of support upon the husband reinforces his position as head of the household, and
women are thus dependent and subservient).
343. See MARRIAGE CoNTRACF, supra note 10, at 74 (noting that for the time women spend doing
housework, they lose the opportunity to develop their own earning power). Women do not seek out the most
lucrative career choices because they are responsible for most of the work at home, such as the cooking,
cleaning, and childrearing duties. Id.; Elaine J. Hall, Waitering/Waitressing: Engendering the Work of Table
Servers, 7 GENDER & Soc'Y 329, 332 (1993) (contending that when women do leave the home and work in the
public sphere they occupy jobs that culturally are considered extensions of femininity, in that they serve, support,
and defer to men).
344. OKIN, supra note 45, at 143.
345. See id. at 144 (finding sales, clerical work, and other predominately female professions, such as
nursing or teaching, provide low pay, poor working conditions, and limited mobility). Instead of science and
engineering fields, which are among the top fields in providing the best economic rewards for an undergraduate
degree, women are much more likely to enter service occupations, such as secretaries, waitresses, and flight
attendants. See Hall, supra note 343, at 330 (noting that 82% of all restaurant servers in 1991 were women);
Stacy J. Rogers & Elizabeth G. Menaghan, Women's Persistence In Undergraduate Majors: The Effects of
Gender-Disproportionate Representation, 5 GENDER & SOC'Y 549, 552-53 (1991) (finding the majors of
aerospace, aviation, engineering, economics, and natural resources to be 80-99% male in 1986 at Ohio State
University). Although women comprise 44% of the labor force, women hold only 15% of all engineering and
science related positions. See idl at 549 (citing NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, WOMEN AND MINORmES IN
ScIENCE AND ENGINEERING (1988)).
346. Powers, supra note 4, at 72-73.
347. See OKIN, supra note 45, at 153 (finding that men are able to compel their wives to do the household
chores). Studies have shown that husbands do not help with housework when their wives also work full-time
jobs. Id. In particular, those husbands of women with full-time jobs contributed only about two minutes more
of housework a day, on average, than did husbands of housewives. Id.
348. 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643 (1st Dist. 1937).
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for their holdings that wives must personally provide nursing care, does
not reflect reality today, due to the transformation of society which
occurred after World War I.351 Thus, despite the formal equality women
largely have achieved with federal statutes such as Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act352 and the 1963 Equal Pay Act,3 53 there still exists
entrenched gender patterns from the long history of women's
subordination, which courts systematically ignore and the Borelli court
perpetuated.354
Courts, like the Borelli court, have failed to recognize the impact of
not enforcing contracts between spouses for the provision of nursing care
services, because the damage is often difficult to recognize. The result of
not enforcing a private agreement between spouses does not appear harm-
ful at first glance, since the ruling does not explicitly discriminate on its
face against one gender over another.355 Saying that both genders are
treated equally when private agreements are not enforced or calling the
family a private area ignores reality.356 The Borelli majority made both
of these faulty arguments. 357 The feminist critique of the public/private
dichotomy shows that it is not always beneficial for courts to stay out of
the marriage relationship.358 Courts did not want to interfere with the
349. 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 119 P.2d 970 (2d Dist 1941).
350. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993).
351. See OKIN, supra note 45, at 140 (submitting that until World War II, society strongly disapproved
of married women working outside the home for a wage); supra notes 301-312 and accompanying text
(highlighting the dissent's statement that since women work outside the home in greater numbers today than
before World War 11, women should not be required to quit their jobs and personally care for ill husbands).
352. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (1981); see supra note 174 and accompanying text (setting forth the
federal and state provisions which guarantee equal access for women in society).
353. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978); see supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting legislative enactments
that attempt to give women the same treatment as men).
354. See supra notes 130-187 and accompanying text (discussing the chronology of the historical
subordination of women, followed by the achievement of formal equality, but noting that there is still subtle
discrimination against women).
355. See Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (1st Dist. 1993) (noting
that the rule it perpetuates, which permits no compensation for nursing care services, was applied in Borelli in
a gender-neutral way).
356. See iU. at 651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (refusing to enforce an agreement made within the context of
a marriage, out of concern for the dignity of marriage).
357. See id. at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (noting that the rule of Sonnicksen and Brooks has been applied
to both husbands and wives in a gender-neutral way, and so it does not matter that the rule denying
compensation for support originated due to conditions peculiar to women); supra notes 227-239 and
accompanying text (discussing the Borelli majority's reasoning).
358. For example, at one time women were not given legal protection or remedies when their husbands
physically abused them. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 131, at *444-45 (finding that at common law a husband
was allowed to physically harm his wife); Karst, supra note 158, at 639 (reporting that the law has approached
disputes between a husband and wife with a laissez-faire attitude). Even today rape laws in many states give an
exception for a husband's forced intercourse with his wife. Taub & Schneider, supra note 9, at 155. See supra
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marital relationship, until quite recently, because lawsuits by one spouse
against another would allegedly disrupt marital harmony.359 Courts have
stated, without giving any explanation, that discord will arise if wives are
given the right to sue their husbands. 36 The failure to enforce private
agreements for nursing care, however, overlooks the effects of gender roles
played by men and women, and ignores the economic structure of
361marriage.
Courts, thus, need to pierce the public/private veil in order to treat men
and women truly equally. 362 Judges need to recognize the injustice that
they perpetuate. It is not enough for judges to take notice that men and
women need to be given the same treatment under the law. Courts also
should take positive action to correct the non-enforcement of domestic
contracts, and thereby stop sending the message that the issues which
concern women are not important, if they are not the proper subject for a
contract. The first step is to stop adhering to outdated precedent. As put
forth forcefully by Justice Poche's dissent in Borelli, society has changed
since Sonnicksen and Brooks were decided. To personally care for
someone twenty-four hours a day, as Hildegard Borelli did for her spouse
struck by a debilitating stroke, requires that the woman forgo or terminate
a career; no matter how lucrative, thus is not realistic. 363 More attractive
options exist, such as obtaining professional and non-professional help, and
getting assistance from friends and relatives.3 4 In addition to courts like
Borelli failing to take into account entrenched gender roles which
subjugate women, the refusal to enforce a contract between husband and
notes 157-168 and accompanying text (decrying the absence of the law from the private sphere, which works
to the detriment of women by allowing men to control the marriage relationship).
359. See Brooks v. Brooks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (2d Dist. 1941) (declaring that
to allow spouses to contract with each other for domestic services will disrupt their marriage relationship).
360. Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883).
361. See Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L.
REv. 721,722-23 (1993) (arguing that women who make the commitment to the family rather than employment
are hurt by the shift from fault-based grounds for divorce to no-fault divorce, since no-fault grounds remove the
protection for these women who put the family first). Under fault-based divorce, courts gave an innocent wife
permanent support money from her husband, hLa at 722.
362. See Powers, supra note 4, at 73 (finding irony in the fact that while the legal order serves to enforce
and legitimize the segregation of women into the private sphere, the law provides the tools to alleviate the
segregation).
363. Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 660, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 24 (1st Dist. 1993) (Poch6, J.,
dissenting).
364. Id; see PETER HANSEL & CYNTHIA WILLIAMS, CALIFORNIA SENATE OmcE OF RESEARCH, WHO'LL
TAKE CARE OF MOM AND DAD? IMPROVING ACCESS TO LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR CALIFORNIA'S
GROWING ELDERLY AND FUNCTIONALLY IMPAIRED POPULATION I (Rebecca LaVally ed., 1991) (discussing the
life of an elderly woman who cares for her disabled husband). She gets a respite from nursing him, when the
volunteers and hired help arrive, for only eight hours a week. hI.
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wife deprives women of the power to contract. 6 Denial of the power to
contract for nursing care keeps women at home in the private sphere, since
it takes away two options-first, she cannot contract out of the personal
duty and get another person to care for her ill husband while she works,
and second, non-enforcement of marital contracts mandates that she cannot
not receive compensation for that which may be her only occupation,
domestic services.
Marital contracts should be treated the same as contracts between non-
married parties to prevent subordination of women.36 6 Parties should be
free to enter into agreements and have courts enforce their objectively.
manifested intent.3 67 In fact, the freedom of contract policy has been
established by the California Legislature.368 Family Code section 721
permits husband and wife to contract with each other as if they were not
married.369 The Borelli court ignored this statutory provision and, as a
result, denied Hildegard the ability to work outside the home, since she
was to personally provide nursing care to Michael. Therefore, courts
should apply section 721 and let husbands and wives contract with each
other for domestic services.
The absurdity of the inability of spouses to contract for domestic
services is demonstrated by Marvin v. Marvin.370 In Marvin, the contract
was between a couple that was not married, but rather had been living
together for seven years. 37 The Supreme Court of California held that
a contract that exchanged property for domestic services was enforceable,
and not against public policy.372 The Marvin Court stated that a promise
to perform homemaking services is adequate consideration to support a
contract.373 The only difference between the Marvin contract and the
Borelli agreement was a marriage certificate. Both agreements sought to
exchange the provision of household services for property, and were
between two people who lived together in a confidential relationship.
365. See MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 10, at 341 (arguing that the practice of allowing spouses to
contract regarding property, but not the duties that comprise support, is arbitrary and may produce discriminatory
results).
366. See id. at 352 (noting the impropriety of failing to give married parties the same assurances that their
contracts will be enforced as unmarried parties).
367. See Dalton, supra note 22, at 1000 (describing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as preferring
objective intent, instead of the unexpressed subjective intent).
368. CAL FAM. CODE § 721 (West 1994).
369. Id
370. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
371. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1976).
372. Id, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32 (1976).
373. Id at 670 n.5, 557 P.2d at 113 n.5, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 822 n.5.
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Given the discriminatory results, a marriage certificate should not be used
to limit the contracting ability of spouses.374
B. The California Legislature Should Clarify Family Code Section 850
and Nullify Borelli, Since its Holding is Contrary to a Specific
Legislative Enactment
The effect of Borelli is unclear since Family Code section 850 arguably
controlled the Borelli's agreement, but was ignored by the court.37 It is,
therefore, unfortunate that Borelli may be followed by other courts. If
Borelli is followed, the court's misapplication of the law and its negative
effect upon women will be perpetuated. To establish that the Borelli court
was incorrect to ignore Family Code section 850, it is necessary to show
that the statute was applicable to the agreement between Hildegard and
Michael. The statute's applicability depends upon its correct interpretation,
in light of the express language and the legislative intent.
Without any reference to Family Code section 850, the majority in
Borelli decided that the agreement between Michael and Hildegard was
unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.376 The court reasoned that
there was no consideration because a pre-existing duty requires a married
person to care for her ill spouse. 377 Since Hildegard already had the
statutorily created duty to provide for Michael, the Borelli court stated that
she gave up nothing by agreeing to provide the nursing care services to
him. 378 The express language of Family Code section 850, however,
specifically states that consideration is not required for a transmutation
agreement regarding property.379
When construing a statute, the place to begin is with the language of
the statute.38 0 Courts should give effect to the plain meaning of the
374. MARRIAGE CoNTriAcr, supra note 10, at 341; see Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 658, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 23 (Pocht, J., dissenting) (finding fault with the rule that would allow Michael and Hildegard to contract for
nursing care if they were strangers, but not allowing it simply because they happened to be married).
375. See CAL FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (noting that married persons may agree to transmute
property with or without consideration); supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements
for a transmutation, and that consideration is explicitly not required).
376. Borelli, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
377. Id.
378. 1&.
379. CAL FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994); see supra notes 248-252 and accompanying text (discussing
Borelli, which held that because there was no consideration, the contract was not entitled to enforcement); supra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of California Family Code § 850 (effective Jan.
1, 1994) (reenacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110.710 (West Supp. 1993))
380. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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statute's words.38' The issue here is whether the word 'transmutation' in
section 850 contemplates only gift transmutations that are already
executed, or whether it also allows for executory agreements such as the
agreement in Borelli.382 The agreement between Hildegard and Michael
is an executory contract because Michael had not changed title of the
property to Hildegard's separate property as agreed.383 Section 850 does
not expressly limit itself to executed transmutations. It is, therefore, logical
to conclude that the legislature intended the language of the statute to
apply to all transmutations.384 Consideration is not required for executory
transmutations.
It may be necessary to look at more than the statute's language, since
a plain reading of the statute may not illuminate the subtle issues that
confronted the drafters. While the language of a statute is usually
considered conclusive, it may be necessary to explore whether there is a
contrary legislative intent expressed elsewhere.385 In this vein, California
Civil Code section 1859 provides that a court should attempt to understand
the intention of the legislature when interpreting a statute.386 The trans-
mutation sections now codified at Family Code sections 850 to 853 were
added to effectuate the recommendations of the California Law Revision
Commission (the Commission). Therefore, any legislative intent behind the
enactment of the strict standards for transmutations would be found in the
381. Burden v. Snowden, 2 Cal. 4th 556, 562, 828 P.2d 672, 676 (1992). Courts should effectuate the
intent of the legislature which promulgated the statute, which is accomplished by looking at the language of the
statute. See Duty v. Abex Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 742, 749, 263 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1st Dist. 1989) (noting that
courts should adopt the literal interpretation of a statute, unless that meaning would be repugnant to the obvious
purpose of the statute).
382. See William A. Reppy Jr., Debt Collection from Married Californians: Problems Caused by
Transmutations, Single-Spouse Management, and Invalid Marriages, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 143, 145 (1981)
(stating that community or separate property of a husband or wife can be changed into another form of
ownership by either a spousal contract or by a gift from one spouse to the other).
383. See Linville v. Linville, 132 Cal. App. 2d 800, 803, 283 P.2d 34, 35 (2d Dist. 1955) (pointing out
that for an executory contract, there is some act by a contracting party that remains to be done). In comparison,
an executed contract requires no additional acts by either party to complete the transaction. Id.
384. See Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Anthony, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1145, 1160, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 43, 53 (3d
Dist. 1993) (noting that a court should presume the legislature knows how to say what it wants, and means what
it says). Thus, when the legislature fails to mention something, a court should conclude that it was intentional.
Id. at 1160, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
385. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); see CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1858 (West 1985) (limiting the judge's duty to declaring what is contained in the statute's language, and not
to removing terms that have been inserted).
386. CAL Cv. CODE § 1859 (West 1983).
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Commission's reports.3' The Commission's reports, however, are silent
on the issue of executory transmutations.38 ' The Commission instead
focused discussion upon the requirements for a writing, and upon how the
new law dispenses with prior case law allowing oral transmutations.3 89
Given that neither the express language of the statute nor the legislative
intent prohibits application of section 850 to an executory agreement, the
Borelli court should have applied Family Code section 850.
The legislature needs to clarify the effect which section 850 has on
executory agreements and thereby nullify Borelli. The need for legislative
action is particularly acute given the California Supreme Court's denial of
review in Borelli.39° Since precedent is to be followed by all inferior tri-
bunals under the principle of stare decisis, even an improper decision must
be followed by lower courts.3 91 Borelli establishes dangerous precedent
for dealing with intraspousal transmutations, since its decision is contrary
to the statutes. Trial courts throughout the state are bound by decisions of
all the courts of appeal.392 Since trial courts decide most of the cases in
our judicial system, the misapplication of the law, and the effect of the
387. See AB 2274 Communication, supra note 68, at 67 (stating that California Assembly Member
McAlister introduced Assembly Bill 2274, which added California Civil Code §§ 5110.710 to 5110.740, to
implement the Commission's advice). California Civil Code §§ 5110.710 to 5110.740 have been recodified in
the new California Family Code at sections 850 to 854, effective January 1, 1994.
388. See Recommendation for Transmutations, supra note 68, at 213-15 (failing to address both the
consideration requirement and the issue of executory transmutations).
389. See id. (discussing rejection of the traditional California rule that allowed easy transmutations, without
meeting the Statute of Frauds requirement). Prior to the enactment of California Family Code sections 850 to
853, case law permitted spouses to transmute property with a writing, an oral declaration, or by the court
implying an agreement from the conduct of the parties. See, e.g., Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal.
2d 697, 701-02, 299 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1956) (holding the wife's statement to her husband, that when they got
married her considerable separate property would become the couple's community property, was a transmutation
of her separate property to community property); Linville v. Linville, 132 Cal. App. 2d 800, 802, 283 P.2d 34,
35 (2d Dist. 1955) (finding a transmutation when the husband stated, along with other similar statements, that
the home was to be 'ours'); In re Raphael's Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 936-37, 206 P.2d 391, 394 (1st Dist.
1949) (maintaining a transmutation where the decedent told his wife that they were partners in everything, and
everything was fifty-fifty).
390. Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993), review denied, Borelli
v. Brusseau, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 1981, at *1 (Apr. 1, 1993).
391. People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th 175, 235, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 148 (2d Dist. 1992); see
People v. Franc, 218 Cal. App. 3d 588, 593, 267 Cal. Rptr. 109, 112 (2d Dist. 1990) (maintaining that only the
California Supreme Court, and not a lower California court, can depart from an appropriate precedent set by the
California Supreme Court).
392. Reygoza v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 3d 514, 521, 281 Cal. Rptr. 390, 394 (2d Dist. 1991); see
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) (contending that respect for precedent
is indispensable to the very concept of the rule of law); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172
(1988) (noting that any departure from stare decisis requires special justification). When a court is asked to
overrule an established precedent regarding interpretation of a statute, a greater burden of proof is placed upon
the proponent, due to the special force precedent has in the area of statutory interpretation. Id.
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incorrect law upon women, will be perpetuated. Although other courts of
appeal are not bound by the holding in Borelli, the decision may have a
persuasive effect on these courts, especially if it is an issue of first impres-
sion for that court of appeal.393
If no action is taken by the legislature, judges will be forced to decide
on a case-by-case basis the adequacy of consideration in marital agree-
ments. Judicial measuring of the adequacy of consideration has expressly
been rejected by most courts, including those in California, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, and also by legal commentators.39' Per-
mitting judges to rule upon the adequacy of consideration will give them
too much latitude to inject their views into written documents.395 It is
likely that judges will have a traditional view which favors the male.
Subjectivity on the part of the judges will allow them to infuse their views
when deciding which promises deserve enforcement, rather than looking
solely to the document at issue.396
An effect of judicial subjectivity is that there will be no assurances of
whether the consideration given is adequate, and one will not know if a
marital agreement will be considered valid by a court adjudicating the
issue in the future. Not knowing whether the consideration will support an
393. See Henry v. Associated Indem. Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 1405, 1416, 266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 585 (4th
Dist. 1990) (declaring that under the doctrine of stare decisis, California appellate court decisions are not binding
on other California courts of the same level).
394. See Taylor v. Taylor, 66 Cal. App. 2d 390, 398, 152 P.2d 480, 488 (2d Dist. 1944) (holding that
consideration of any value, no matter how slight, will support the most onerous obligation); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 75, § 79 cmt. c (rejecting both an adequacy and a sufficiency test for the requirement of
consideration); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 2.11 (stating the traditional adequacy of consideration 'pepper
corn' test as allowing things of very small value to serve as consideration so long as they are part of a bargained
exchange); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88 (3d ed. 1986) (declaring it improper to have
courts decide upon adequacy of consideration, since a court would have to decide whether the contract terms
are reasonable, which courts are even less equipped to do than are the parties to the transaction at issue); see
also Spaulding v. Benenati, 442 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (N.Y. 1982) (showing that courts, following the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, recognize that adequacy of consideration is not within the proper scope of judicial
scrutiny); Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Me. 394, 397 (1839) (noting that valuable consideration can be met with a cent
or a pepper corn).
395. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168-69 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that tests which
allow judges to interject their own ethics and morals are dangerous, since they permit judges to strike down laws
they do not like, rather than be restricted by the fixed boundaries of the documents' written words); In re
Freeman's Estate, 238 Cal. App. 2d 486,488, 48 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (2d Dist. 1965) (reporting that courts will not
weigh the sufficiency of consideration for a promise once it has been found to be of some value, and some value
generally means any value whatsoever); Blonder v. Gentile, 149 Cal. App. 2d 869, 875, 309 P.2d 147, 150 (4th
Dist. 1957) (noting that valid consideration does not depend upon its value, and the law ordinarily does not
weigh its quantum).
396. Duncan at 168-69; see Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 562 (1933)
(submitting that the decision of whether to enforce an agreement is a policy decision); Dalton, supra note 22,
at 1099 (arguing that since courts can inject their own policy decisions in deciding whether to find an
enforceable contract, virtually any decision is possible).
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already agreed upon contract puts the party which complies with the
agreement in a perilous position. If one party has completed its side of the
contracted performance, but the other party does not comply, the party that
has performed will look to a court for a remedy. The complying party will
assert that a court should enforce the agreement, since that party, like
Hildegard, will have totally performed. Failure by a court to enforce these
contracts due to a subjective measurement which concludes there is a lack
of consideration will frustrate the party who fulfilled its side of the
agreement. The frustration will be valid, since the complying party
performed its end of the bargain with the belief that the other party would
also comply, and if not, that a court could be persuaded to compel contract
performance.
C. The Borelli Majority Ignored the Alternatives to Consideration
Even if one accepts that the Borelli court overlooked Family Code
section 850, there were alternatives available to enforce the agreement as
Hildegard requested. The failure of the Borelli court to implement any of
these widely accepted methods demonstrates how modem courts continue
to subtly discriminate against women. There exist two alternatives to the
traditional consideration requirement for contracts, both of which have
their roots in equity."
First, the Borelli court could have rejected the demurrer to Hildegard's
complaint by examining exceptions to the formal contract requirements. In
particular, contracts formed without consideration can be overcome by
showing detrimental reliance.39 The doctrine of detrimental reliance, also
called promissory estoppel, is a substitute for consideration."' The
doctrine has been accepted by the California Supreme Court.4° There are
three requirements for detrimental reliance-the promisee must actually
397. See Vargas Estate, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (2d Dist. 1974) (stating that
equity allows exceptions to the rule of law where the application of a universal law would cause injustice). If
there is no adequate remedy at law, then courts may dispense equitable relief. Estes v. Rowland, 14 Cal. App.
4th 508, 535, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 917 (1st Dist. 1993).
398. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 90 (establishing that a court may grant a remedy for a breached
promise, if the promisor should reasonably have expected the promise to induce such action by the promisee,
and the promise did in fact induce such action).
399. Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 943, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (2d Dist. 1970); see
Maclsaac & Menke Co. v. Freeman, 194 Cal. App. 2d 327, 333, 15 Cal. Rptr, 48, 52 (2d Dist. 1961) (stating
that a lack of consideration does not have to stop enforcement of a promise, since the very purpose of
detrimental reliance is to make a promise binding, even without consideration, if there exists reasonable reliance
upon the promise).
400. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 413, 333 P.2d 757, 759 (1958).
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rely upon the promise, the promisor must have had reason to expect the
reliance that occurred, and courts can limit the recovery to that which is
necessary to do justice.4 1 Hildegard relied upon the promise that
Michael would transmute his separate property to her, to her detriment,
and therefore the remedy of specifically enforcing the agreement is avail-
able to the court even if there was no consideration for the agreement.
Those in opposition to contracts for domestic services, however, would
likely point to the Sonnicksen-Brooks rule that forbids enforcement of such
contracts, and argue that detrimental reliance or any other doctrine should
not be used to circumvent the prohibition. The Sonnicksen-Brooks rule,
though, should no longer be a bar, since it has been demonstrated it is
based upon outmoded views of women, which lead to their subordi-
nation.'
Second, the remedy of unjust enrichment is another ground for
recovery that the Borelli court could have employed to give Hildegard
relief. The doctrine of unjust enrichment, also referred to as quantum
meruit, is a common law remedy which has been accepted by California
courts." 3 Unjust enrichment gives a remedy where one party has become
unjustly enriched as a result of another party's actions.404 California
courts have specifically stated that unjust enrichment applies to a situation
such as the one which was present in Borelli: a person who renders ser-
vices under an invalid oral contract to dispose of real property by will may
secure quantum meruit for the value of those services.405 A possible
remedy for unjust enrichment is a fair monetary sum that represents the
worth of the benefit conferred.4°6
401. RESTATEIENT, supra note 75, § 90(1); see 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 2.19 (noting that the
Restatement's most influential rule is § 90). Professor Farnsworth also points out that the Restatement (First)
of Contracts differs from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in that the Second Restatement allows for courts
to limit the remedy as justice requires, rather than requiring specific performance of the promise. Id.
402. See supra notes 87-129 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions in Sonnicksen and Brooks).
403. Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80,88, 193 P. 84,87-88 (1920); Freedom Fin. Thrift & Loan v. Golden
Pac. Bank, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1314, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 240 (2d Dist. 1993); Orella v. Johnson, 38 Cal.
2d 693, 697, 242 P.2d 5, 7 (1952).
404. 1 FARNSwORTH, supra note 14, § 2.20.
405. Zellner, 184 Cal. at 88, 193 P. at 87-88; Orella, 38 Cal. 2d at 697,242 P.2d at 7; see RESTATEMENT
OF RFtsrrON, § 40 cmt. a (stating that where one has obtained services by manifesting a desire to receive
the services from the party rendering them, as if there existed an agreement, it is not unfair to require him to
pay for the services).
406. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 405, § 1 cmt. a (stating that the normal measure of restitution is the
amount of the enrichment received); id § 4(f) (noting that an unjust enrichment judgment can be for a payment
of money, either directly or by way of set off or counter-claim).
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There are two requirements that Hildegard must have plead to establish
her quantum meruit claim: a benefit conferred upon Michael by her
actions; and that it would be unjust for Michael to retain the benefit. 40 7
Here, Hildegard meets the two-prong requirement for a recovery based
upon unjust enrichment. First, she provided nursing care to Michael. The
nursing care, according to California law and the Restatement of Resti-
tution, is a benefit conferred, since it saved the community from having to
pay for nursing care out of the community property.4 8 If no community
property existed, then Michael would have had to use his own separate
property to cover the nursing care expenses. Any form of advantage is a
benefit. The second requirement, unjustness, is met, due to the fact
that Hildegard performed her side of the bargain, only to have Michael fail
to change his will to effectuate their agreement. Besides fulfilling the two
requirements necessary, the policies behind unjust enrichment also favor
a recovery for Hildegard. Society wants its members to deal with each
other on a level of fundamental fairness, which leads to condemning a
member who receives unjust enrichment at the expense of another.410
The policy advocating fairness favors Hildegard because she contracted
with her husband, possessing of free will, and he failed to come through
on his side of the agreement. Enforcement would also implement policies
that advocate protection of the justified expectations of the parties, and
prevention of any forfeiture which might result if the contract is not
enforced.4 n
The last method the Borelli court could have used to uphold Hilde-
gard's claim would have been to seek out an alternative basis for consi-
deration without resorting to equity. Consideration did in fact exist in
Borelli, since Hildegard took on a legal detriment. Failing to assert a right
that one possesses is enough to fulfill the consideration requirement.412
Hildegard refrained from asserting a legal right of hers. In particular, she
did not leave the marriage by divorce, even though she had the legal right
407. California Fed. Bank v. Matreyek, 8 Cal. App. 4th 125, 132, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 62 (2d Dist. 1992);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 405, § I cmt. a.
408. Malreyek, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 131, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61; RESTATEMENTr, supra note 405, § I cmt.
b.
409. RESTATEMENT, supra note 405, § 1 cmt. b.
410. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 174,793 P.2d 479, 516,271 Cal. Rptr. 146,
182 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
411. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 5.1.
412. See In re Thomson's Estate, 165 Cal. 290,296-97, 131 P. 1045, 1048 (1913) (stating that forbearance,
which is refraining from doing that which one has the right to do, is sufficient consideration to support a
contract).
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to a divorce.413 As the promisee, Hildegard assumed a legal detriment by
forbearing from doing something that she had a legal right to do. This
action meets the definition of consideration.414 The refusal by the Borelli
court to enforce the agreement in favor of Hildegard, in the face of several
feasible alternatives, illustrates the subtle subordination of women in
today's society.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeal for the First District of California, in Borelli v.
Brusseau,415 reiterated the traditional view toward the enforcement of
agreements between spouses for the provision of nursing care services by
refusing to enforce such an agreement.4 6 As a result of such holdings,
women are not allowed to contract with their husbands for the provision
of any domestic services that they render, thus depriving many women of
their sole means to earn a living. Women who do not work outside the
home are financially dependent upon their husbands. Being dependent
usually is not an issue when the marriage relationship stays intact. Women
become vulnerable to financial problems, however, when there is a divorce
or death, since their means of support, the husband, is no longer there to
provide support.
The effect of the Borelli rule is to continue the subordination of
women. The subordination occurs due to the dichotomy of the public and
private spheres. The public/private dichotomy arises when courts hold that
a woman's only place is in the home, taking care of her husband and
children. These entrenched gender patterns keep women from venturing
into the public world of business, politics and law by mandating that
women spend time in the private sphere. In order to gain true equality for
women, versus the formal equality women have largely achieved through
legislative enactments, courts must begin to understand what wrongs their
decisions cause. Only by piercing the veil that protects the private sphere
413. See CAL FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 1994) (providing that irreconcilable differences are grounds for
a dissolution); id. § 2311 (West 1994) (defining irreconcilable differences as substantial reasons which allow
a court to decide that the marriage should not continue, but rather, that it should be dissolved).
414. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256,257 (N.Y. 1891) (finding a legal detriment where the promisee
abstained from doing something he had the legal right to do--smoke cigarettes-in exchange for monetary
compensation); supra notes 312-323 and accompanying text (noting an argument of the dissent, that if Hildegard
had left, and Michael enticed her to come back by offering his separate property should she return, a court would
likely find consideration for the agreement).
415. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1st Dist. 1993).
416. See supra notes 208-265 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's decision in Borelli).
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from law's intrusion, and bringing justice into the private world where
many women dwell, will women ever have true equality with men.
Wendy L. Hillger
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